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Despite the increased frequency of natural and man-made disasters, there is a problem in 
the level of preparedness of emergency managers, responders, and citizens to address 
them.  The purpose of this grounded theory study was to explore the factors that affect 
these groups’ preparedness to inform the development of better emergency plans to 
handle emergency incidences.  The conceptual framework for the study was knowledge 
management, which was used with a grounded theory approach.  The study was guided 
by primary research questions that focused on understanding psychological, material, 
temporal, organizational, and other factors that affect the preparedness of emergency 
managers, first responders, and citizens, and on identifying measures for improving those 
levels of preparedness. Interview data were collected from a purposeful sample of 
emergency managers (n = 11), first responders (n = 26), and citizens (n = 26) from South 
Carolina who had experienced disasters. Secondary data from 6 disasters, 3 emergency 
operations plans, and 2 standard operating procedure guides were also collected.  The 
constant comparative method was used to analyze data, informing the development of a 
theory that suggests emergency managers, first responders, and citizens must act 
collaboratively to prepare for and respond more effectively to disasters, in addition to 
their independent work.  This study promotes positive social change by providing 
emergency management agencies with information necessary for developing better 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Background 
Natural and human-induced disasters have severely affected the United States in 
the past few decades.  Although disasters cannot be prevented, steps can be taken to 
minimize their negative impact (Seneviratne, Baldry, & Pathirage, 2010).  A lack of 
preparedness for disasters, however, has contributed to high death tolls, major property 
damage, and economic hardship throughout the United States (Donahue & Joyce, 2001; 
Seneviratne et al., 2010).   
Despite the many opportunities for training, public education, and other 
mechanisms available to increase awareness (e.g., emergency communication networks, 
neighborhood siren alerts, special weather bulletins, and media press conferences), 
adequate disaster preparedness is still lacking (Helsloot & Ruitenburg, 2004; Kapucu, 
2008).  Citizens, first responders, and emergency managers have been responsible for this 
lack of preparedness (Asproth & Nystrom, 2010).  The aim of this study is to identify 
factors that affect the ability of citizens, first responders, and emergency managers to 
prepare for disasters.  
The United States has faced many natural and human-made disasters over the past 
two decades.  Religious fundamentalism, nationalism, ethnic conflicts, and the effects of 
global warming have all perpetuated the need to be prepared (Flood & Cahoon, 2011; 
Segal, 2003).  The World Trade Center air craft bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, 





United States over the past few decades (Housman, Hanlon, & Seal, 2007; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation [FBI], n.d.).  These events have caused significant loss of life and 
property and have had negative consequences on the general economy (Seneviratne et al., 
2010). 
 Local, state, and federal agencies in the United States have traditionally planned 
for disasters according to preparedness stages (Seneviratne et al., 2010).  These 
preparedness stages are defined as “activities, programs, and systems developed in 
advance of a disaster designed to build and enhance capabilities at an individual, 
business, community, state and federal level to support response to and recover from 
disaster” (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2010, p. 1).  The 
preparedness stages include mitigation, planning, response, and recovery (FEMA), 2010; 
Seneviratne et al., 2010). 
The mitigation stage refers to any activity that can reduce or eliminate the risk of 
a potential hazard occurring (FEMA, 2010).  The planning stage refers to developing 
emergency operation plans and standard operating procedures that address potential 
hazards (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2010).  The next stage—the response 
phase—begins as soon as the disaster occurs (FEMA, 2010).  This stage includes the 
coordination of emergency first responders, the activation of the emergency operation 
plans, and any other plans that are pertinent to the emergency reponse effort (FEMA, 
2010).  The final stage includes recovery operations that address the basic needs of those 





close to pre-incident conditions as possible (FEMA, 2010).  These stages are addressed in 
all emergency operations plans to ensure adequate responses to all disastrous events.   
Disasters are events requiring a collaborative response effort from citizens, first 
responders, and emergency managers (Henstra, 2010).  Some disasters and disaster-
created hazards that require this type of response are tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, 
terrorist attacks, floods, severe thunderstorms, train derailments, and hazardous material 
emissions (Henstra, 2010).  Disasters may be large-scale events that require a large 
response, or they may be relatively small in scale and require only a small response 
(Flanagan, Gregory, Hallisey, Heitgerd, & Lewis, 2011).  Irrespective of scale, being 
prepared for disasters is critical to surviving one.   
A timely and accurate response to a disaster includes having the proper personnel 
and equipment to contend with the threat.  It also includes coordinating resources so that 
they can be used in the most effective way (Schafer et al., 2008).  An effective 
emergency management effort requires the collaboration of first responders, citizens, and 
emergency management agencies.  The absence of a collaborative effort can result in lack 
of communication, improper resource allocation, and repetition of efforts by different 
entities involved in the response (Schafer et al., 2008).  Local emergency management 
agencies in the United States are responsible for developing plans to facilitate a timely 
and accurate response to a disaster with respect to its identified potential hazards 





Overall, people in the United States have not taken the steps needed to prepare for 
disasters (Housman et al., 2007).  An example is Hurricane Katrina, which in 2005 hit the 
US coast near the Louisiana-Mississippi border at approximately 125 miles per hour 
(Drye, 2005).  Katrina’s front-right quadrant, which contained the strongest wind and 
peak storm surge, slammed into Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi, destroying much of 
both cities; a major levee in New Orleans also failed during the same storm (Drye, 2005).  
Katrina was considered the worst storm in the past 100 years in the United States 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2005).  It also highlighted many 
deficiencies in the level of preparedness of emergency management agencies, first 
responders, and citizens.  The after-action review, which was a detailed report of events 
that occurred during the response efforts to Hurricane Katrina, cited six major problems: 
• Clear objectives were not established for responding agencies. 
• Organizational structure and incident command systems failed.  
• Information flow and management were inadequate. 
• Public health practices were not in place. 
• There was a lack of public awareness and evacuations.  
• There was a lack of training and exercise initiatives designed to test people’s 
ability to respond to emergency situations in a training environment (Besser, 





In the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, a parked truck loaded with explosives 
blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.  This attack revealed that the American 
people are not impervious to terrorist attacks (Wilentz, 2011). The after-action review 
said that Timothy McVeigh, who perpetrated the attack, was acting in retaliation for the 
government’s siege on a compound in Waco, Texas, two years earlier (Kaplan, 2011).  
This incident uncovered many deficiencies in preparedness efforts and changed how the 
United States viewed terrorism (Wilentz, 2011).   
The after-action review showed that the federal government’s response plans for 
disasters needed to be revised to incorporate plans for federal law enforcement, and that 
state and local plans needed to mirror the federal and regional response plans (FBI, n.d.).  
It also identified a need to conduct training among federal, state, and local emergency 
management with local fire and law enforcement services (FBI, n.d.).  Finally, the after-
action review deemed integration of federal, state, and local cooperative partnerships to 
be essential for managing acts of terrorism (FBI, n.d.).   
Several terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001, also known as 
9/11, showed that the United States was not impervious to attacks on its native soil using 
commercial aircraft as weapons.  On this day, two passenger planes flew into the north 
and south towers of the World Trade Center; a third flew into the Pentagon; and another 
crashed landed in a field in Pennsylvania (9/11 Commission, 2004).  This timed event, 





actions taken by emergency and law enforcement agencies in the United States in the past 
were inadequate to deal with these new threats (9/11 Commission, 2004).    
Problem Statement 
This study addressed the problem of the lack of preparedness demonstrated by 
emergency managers, first responders, and citizens in the United States prior to major 
catastrophic incidents (Harrington, 2010; Penades, Borgas, Vivacqua, Canos, & Solis, 
2011).  Although voluminous information is available on the Internet and other 
information sources, regarding the need to be prepared, the efforts taken by various local, 
county, and state emergency management agencies and communities have a 
demonstrated a history of inadequately preparing these entities for disastrous situations 
such as earthquakes, tornadoes, terrorist attacks, train derailment, hurricanes, and floods.  
Preparedness is “a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, 
exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective 
coordination during incident response” (DHS, 2010, p. 1).  
Hurricane Katrina, the post-9/11 New Hampshire anthrax incident, Oklahoma 
City Bombing, and the World Trade Center aircraft attacks, have shown that people in the 
United States often do not prepare adequately for disastrous events.  In each of these 
incidents, a lack of preparedness accounted for a greater loss of lives and property than 
necessary (Uhr, Johansson, & Fredholm, 2008).  It remains unclear why it is so difficult 
to capture the attention of citizens, emergency managers, and first responders so that they 





Purpose of the Study 
Natural and human-induced disasters are growing in frequency in the 21st century 
(Kiltz, 2011).  In such situations, the need to respond and take appropriate action in 
advance is paramount.  Harrington (2010) argued that lack of prior crisis management 
training has hindered the response of some public safety managers to emergencies such 
as disasters, and further stated that by failing to detect and respond proactively to critical 
incidents, public safety managers can inhibit the response to a crisis.  The purpose of this 
qualitative research study was to explore the level of preparedness of emergency 
managers, first responders, and citizens to handle disastrous situations.  The goal is to use 
this information to develop a theory on the interactions among various factors and to 
make recommendations to enhance preparedness.  
Harrington (2010) studied the lack of preparedness on the part of the public safety 
managers who oversee the day-to-day activities of first responders.  However, Harrington 
did not take into account the level of preparedness that should be shared by emergency 
managers, first responders, and citizens to handle disastrous situations collaboratively, 
thereby creating a research gap.  This exploration of why some emergency managers, 
first responders, and citizens are not prepared was designed to address this gap and to 
assist in developing better collaborative and comprehensive plans to address these gaps in 
preparedness measures. 
Research Questions 





RQ1. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other— 
significantly affect the preparedness of emergency managers in responding 
to disasters? 
RQ2. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other— 
significantly affect the preparedness of first responders in responding to 
disasters? 
RQ3. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other—
significantly affect the preparedness of citizens in responding to disasters? 
RQ4. What measures can emergency managers, first responders, and citizens take 
to improve their respective levels of preparedness in responding to 
disasters? 
Conceptual Framework 
This study used knowledge management as its conceptual framework.  This 
framework argues that an organization can achieve its goals if all parts of the 
organization are brought together to achieve a common purpose and share information to 
that end (Seneviratne et al., 2010).  The ideas prescribed in knowledge management are 
applicable to preparing for, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from a disaster in a 
way that fosters the collective knowledge of all responsible entities (Seneviratne et al., 
2010).  These explicit collective and collaborative efforts are included in the measures 
and actions taken by citizens, first responders, and emergency managers prior to, during, 





efforts from all aspects of those in a system (Mentzer et al., 2009).  This study extended 
this concept by applying knowledge management as a disaster management tool.   
According to Seneviratne et al. (2010), there are three forms of knowledge: 
explicit, tacit, and implicit.  For the purpose of this study, only explict and tacit 
knowledge management tools were used because they work best in trying to explain 
evidence of knowledge needed by emergency managers, first responders, and citizens. 
Implicit knowledge is knowledge that could be expressed, but has not been (Seneviratne 
et al., 2010).  Explicit knowledge can be explained by an individual; in the context of 
disaster management, explicit knowledge includes what is known by individuals about 
risk, vulnerabilities, and the planning needed to reduce a possible threat (Mentzer, Myers, 
& Stank, 2009).  Explicit knowledge also includes the collective knowledge that citizens, 
first responders, and emergency managers have that is useful in preparing for a disaster.  
It can be acquired through lessons learned from previous disasters, after-action reviews 
conducted following a training exercise, and public information bulletins created to assist 
citizens in preparedness actions (Seneviratne et al., 2010).    
Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is not expressed verbally but learned while 
working with others.  This type of knowledge is developed from person-to-person contact 
(Mentzer et al., 2009).  Tacit knowledge is used because emergency managers do not 
necessarily have a formal plan for every incident they encounter, but their knowledge and 
experience of previous disasters provides them with the ability to create a contingency 





Nature of the Study 
The research consisted of a qualitative study using grounded theory methodology, 
as suggested by Charmaz (2006).  I selected a grounded theory approach over other 
qualitative research approaches, such as phenomenology, because the aim of this study 
was to learn what factors affect a certain behaviors, and to infer a theory explaining what 
was happening based on the data collected, as suggested by Levasseur (2011).  In a 
phenomenological study, the researcher attempts to study in depth the “meaning, 
structure, and essence of the lived experience of a phenomena for a person or group of 
people” (Patton, 2002, p. 482) but does not attempt to develop a grounded theory of what 
causes the phenomena.  
When using a grounded theory approach, a constant comparative method is used 
that compares newly collected data with the results from analyzing previously collected 
data (Charmaz, 2006).  This method was used to identify the factors that affect the 
preparedness of emergency managers, first responders, and citizens for disasters in an 
effort to discover ways to improve their preparedness.  Data were collected by means of 
interviews and from archival documents such as after-action reviews of six past disasters, 
prior studies on emergency preparedness, and county emergency management plans.  The 
findings from the analysis of each of these types of data were triangulated to enhance the 
credibility and transferability of the research.   
This was an exploratory study because there are few existing studies on this topic.  





after-action reviews of past disasters.  The review and analysis included 6 documented 
cases of disasters that have affected the United States within the past 10 to 20 years—
Hurricane Katrina (2005), the September 11 aircraft attacks (2001), the Oklahoma City 
truck bombing (1995), the Joplin, Missouri, tornadoes (2011), Hurricane Ike (2008), and 
the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon disaster (2010).   
In addition to case study reviews, I collected data through interviews with a 
number of first responders, including fire chiefs, emergency medical service (EMS) 
directors, police chiefs, and sheriffs who were selected based on their responsibility for 
making the final decisions within their agencies.  A second set of interviews was 
conducted with purposively selected citizens to represent the views of typical members of 
the public.  A third set of interviews was conducted with emergency managers, such as 
emergency management directors.   
Interviews with each set of participants were conducted until saturation was 
reached (i.e., until the interviews no longer yielded new insights).  These participants 
were selected purposively to meet the study objectives, and they provided information on 
their experiences with disaster preparedness.  This allowed for a comparison of themes 
emerging from participants to those of others who experienced the disasters recorded in 
the 6 case studies. The comparisons helped me to develop a grounded theory for why 
people are not adequately prepared for disasters.  
Before I conducted the interviews, all interviewees confirmed their consent to 





by Neale, Shyam, and Carolyn (2006).  Other formal methods of communicating with 
interview participants included telephone calls and emails, as suggested by Neale et al. 
(2006).  Because some of the data collected were from peers in the profession of 
emergency management, gaining access to their facilities to conduct all of the interviews 
in person was not a significant problem.   
Researchers must be aware of discrepancies between assumptions made by the 
researchers according to what they may have heard and what the participants actually 
meant.  It is possible that my established relationships with some of the interviewees 
were a factor in the data collection process.  As a result, I made several efforts to 
minimize any bias that might result from such relationships.  For example, I paid special 
attention to triangulating the data in this research.  
 Triangulation of findings from participant interviews, case study review, and 
secondary data review were used to limit research bias.  I also worked to establish a 
framework of respect with the participants by gaining an understanding of their views on 
the topic from their perspective.  Conversely, these established relationships and the 
resultant trust were likely factors that allowed the participants to feel more at ease and 
open to telling their stories.  All interviews were audio recorded for ease of transcription 
and analysis and to avoid improper reporting stemming from inaccurately recording 
information from participants.  
Researchers must be forthcoming with participants and not attempt to mislead 





interview and how it would be conducted enhanced the level of trust between the 
participants and myself.  Full disclosure of information at the beginning of each interview 
ensured that the participants freely consented to participate in the interviews.  The other 
main aspect of the researcher’s role is to protect the identity of the participants (Creswell, 
2007).  This was done by using codes to identify responses from participants.     
Definitions 
Disasters are the widespread unexpected incidents that affect and disrupt normal 
activity, causing loss of life, damage to property, and severe economic impacts (Webb, 
2007).   
Emergency management is a managerial function charged with creating the 
framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with 
disaster (EM Public Safety, Public Trust, 2007).  
Emergency managers are individuals responsible for coordinating an emergency 
response and requesting aid from other levels of government (Henstra, 2010).  
First responders generally are local fire, police, and emergency medical personnel 
who are responsible for carrying out emergency management efforts.  The role of first 
responders is to protect against, respond to, and assist in the recovery following 
emergency events (DHS, 2003). 
Mitigation consists of actions taken to reduce the loss of life and property prior to 





Planning is the ability to make it possible to manage potential crises throughout 
their life cycles.  Planning helps to establish priorities, identify expected levels of 
performance, and identify capability requirements prior to an incident occurring (FEMA, 
2010).     
Preparedness consists of measures undertaken before disasters occur to improve 
the readiness of organizations and communities to respond to disasters effectively.  
Preparedness includes a cycle of planning, response, recovery, and mitigation (Donahue 
& Joyce, 2001; FEMA, 2010 ).  
Recovery involves steps taken to help people return to their normal operations 
after a disaster has occurred (Donahue & Joyce, 2001).  
Response consists of measures taken immediately after an incident to provide 
assistance to victims who have been affected (Donahue & Joyce, 2001).   
Assumptions 
For the purposes of this study, I assumed that  
• I would be able to interest emergency managers, first responders, and citizens 
in participating in the study;  
• interview participants would answer my questions truthfully;  
• case study data, such as after-action reviews, would be a matter of public 





• access to other secondary data not in the public domain, such as emergency 
operation plans and standard operating procedures, would be granted by 
emergency managers and first responders because I was a member of the 
emergency management community.  
Limitations 
A possible limitation of this research is not being able to generalize the findings 
of the study.  This is because the sampling was conducted purposefully and all of the 
participants were from the state of South Carolina.  Another limitation of the study is that 
emergency managers and first responders who could be directly involved in emergency 
operations may each have different roles during a disaster, which could limit their 
knowledge of all phases of preparedness (i.e., mitigation, planning, response, and 
recovery).   
Scope and Delimitations 
The purpose of this research study was to investigate the factors that have 
prevented emergency managers, first responders, and citizens from being prepared for 
disasters and to build a theory to explain the interaction of these factors.  A primary focus 
of this study was the exploration of the total level of preparedness in the areas of 
mitigation, planning, response, and recovery that were conducted by these entities during 
those disasters.   
The findings from the analysis of case study disaster reviews and other emergency 





interview data collected from participants.  This triangulation of findings provided insight 
into the factors that have hindered past preparedness efforts and the factors that currently 
affect the level of preparedness for disasters.   
The delimitations of this study are a result of the time and financial resources 
needed to investigate this topic fully.  In consideration of financial resources, and while 
acknowledging the need for scientific rigor, I have noted that the scope of this study is 
limited to a purposive sample of emergency managers, first responders, and citizens, 
primarily from South Carolina.  
Significance of the Study 
This research is unique because it addresses an under-researched area of 
preparedness with respect to the increased threat of disasters, such as those that have 
occurred in the United States over the past few decades (Humphress, 2007).  The existing 
literature has tended to focus on response and mitigation efforts as a means of handling 
disastrous situations (Henstra, 2010; Humphress, 2007; Kapucu, 2008).  Although the 
areas of mitigation and response are crucial to suviving a catastrophic incident, the need 
for preparedness is often not adequately addressed by those who are affected  (Donahue 
& Joyce, 2001).  The results of this study have provided insights into the factors affecting 
the preparedness of citizens, first responders, and emergency managers that could lead to 
the creation of improved emergency management plans. The findings of this study could 
have a significant impact on how counties prepare for emergency situations, thus saving 






A review of disastrous situations occurring over many decades has proven that 
many people are not adequately prepared to handle disasters when they strike.  The 
ability to mitigate, prepare, respond to, and recover from disasters is limited by the lack 
of understanding of the factors that will lessen the impact of a disastrous event.  
Gaining a better understanding of the factors that affect the lack of preparedness 
by emergency managers, first responders, and citizens will help in developing better 
training, education, and public relations/outreach efforts needed to better prepare for the 
next major incident.  Hurricane Katrina, the World Trade Center aircraft attacks, 
Oklahoma City Bombing, British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon disaster, Joplin 
Tornados, and Hurricane Ike are just a few disasters that revealed the lack of 
preparedness of emergency managers, first responders, and citizens (FEMA).  A previous 
study investigated the lack of preparedness that involved the training of public safety 
officials and first responders  (Harrington, 2010).  The study examined the lack of 









Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Emergencies can happen any time and usually occur when least expected 
(Seneviratne et al., 2010).  People are slow to respond to impending disasters that could 
affect their way of life.  The purpose of this research study was to determine what factors 
contribute to a lack of citizen disaster preparedness, in an effort to better improve the 
level of preparedness by citizens, first responders, and emergency managers.  This study 
examined the lack of preparedness demonstrated by citizens, first responders, and 
emergency managers during past disasters.  It was specifically designed to determine how 
citizens lack preparation for human-made and natural disasters so as to better inform 
future emergency preparedness programs.   
This chapter includes a review of historical initiatives that have been implemented 
in the development of emergency preparedness and how disaster management has 
changed.  The literature review includes discussions of research on the roles of first 
responders, citizens, and emergency managers and how these roles can collaboratively 
improve preparedness.  It also examines challenges that preparing and responding to 
disaster pose for first responders, citizens, and emergency managers.  The last sections of 
the review include a discussion of the literature related to the conceptual framework for 
this study.   
This examination of the literature provided an in-depth overview of the lack of 
preparedness of emergency managers, first responders, and citizens.  This chapter also 





present from the perspective of the federal, state, and local emergency planning 
initiatives.  I also examined past and present initiatives that have been studied in the field 
of emergency management.  Examining emergency management practices at each level 
included reviewing information on how emergency management initiatives at each level 
work and how these practices have failed during disasters that the United States has 
faced. 
Literature Search Strategy 
 To find sources for this literature review, I conducted a search of peer-reviewed 
journal articles, dissertations, and scholarly publications such as books, after-action 
reviews, and research reports.  The primary databases that I searched were from 
ABI/INFORM Complete, Business Source Complete (EBSCOhost), Homeland Security 
Digital Library, Journal of Emergency Management , Journal of Homeland and 
Emergency Management, and the International Security & Counter-Terrorism Reference 
Center’s Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management and other Scholarly Peer-
Reviewed Journals .   
 The keywords used in the search of literature included emergency management, 
citizen preparedness, preparedness, disaster preparedness, emergency planning, 
emergency response, evacuation, emergency incident, disaster knowledge, community 
rebuilding, factors, human planning, knowledge management, mitigation, risk perception, 
public perception, nongovernmental organizations, and social economics.  The range 





expected completion date.   In addition, some Seminal sources were used to address some 
past work that had been done in the field of study.  
History of Civil Defense 
 In order to understand the evolution of disaster management, it is important to 
define what constitutes types of disasters that have historically affected people.  Disasters 
are nonroutine events that occur without notice (Call, 2010; Henstra, 2010).  Disasters 
can be destructive and disrupt the routine activity of people’s lives (Khunwishit & 
McEntire, 2012).  Fritz, cited in Eighmy and Hall (2012), defined a disaster as an event, 
concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient 
subdivison of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members 
and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted  and the fullfillment of all 
or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented.  
  Disasters can come in the form of natural and human-made incidents that exceed 
the normal capability of a community to respond effectively (Henstra, 2010; Houston, 
Pfefferbaum, & Rosenholtz, 2012).  Natural disasters include, but are not limited to, 
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and landslides (Eighmy & Hall, 2012; Kemp, 
2009).  Human-made disasters include biological incidents, large fires, hazardous spills, 
terrorist activities, and railcar accidents of all types (Houston et al., 2012; Kemp, 2009).    
 US federal, state, and local governments have all undertaken initiatives to address 
the  level of preparedness for disasters nationally.  In 1950, the US Congress passed the 





Union (Ekici & McEntire, 2007; Lieb & Chapman, 2011).  In 1951, President Harry S. 
Truman created the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), which gave funding 
responsibilites to state and local governments to produce awareness campaigns for 
nuclear incidents.   
 However, even with the establishment of these two measures many people in the 
United States remained unprepared to handle a disastrous incident involving a nuclear 
attack from the the Soviet Union (Geist, 2012; Paek, Hilyard, Freimuth, Barge, & 
Mindlin, 2010).  Planning for a nuclear attack included dispersing populated areas as a 
protective measure for civil defense and using bomb shelters to provide safer shelter for 
citizens (Geist, 2012; Lieb & Chapman, 2011).  After it was confirmed in 1951 that the 
sheltering system developed by the Soviet Union would not withstand nuclear fallout, 
this call arose for reevaluation of the U.S. civil defense programs (Geist, 2012).   
 Few studies have examined whether these measures were the best way to prepare 
citizens for attacks of nuclear exposure; this is understandable because there were limited 
resources available to assist during the 1950s.  Most related preparedness efforts focused 
instead on civil defense, public response, and what people thought and felt about a 
nuclear attack (Geist, 2012).  Scholars did not foster preparedness efforts for a nuclear 
attack for citizens, responders, or government officials (Carlo, 2009; Finsterbusch, 1985).  
This was because the government tried to hide the fact that nuclear weapons existed 





Establishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 The evolution of emergency management in the United States has shifted from 
nuclear preparedness to an all-hazard approach to handling both human-made and natural 
disasters (Ekici & McEntire, 2007; Henstra, 2010).  The threat of natural and human-
made disasters has increased over the past few decades, increasing the need for countries 
to be prepared for all types of disasters (Julca, 2010; Perry & Niggs, 1985; Seneviratne et 
al., 2010).  Between 1900 and 1909, natural disasters occurred 73 times in the United 
States, whereas between the years 2000 and 2005, the number of natural and manmade 
disasters rose to 2,788 (Seneviratne et al, 2010).  Failure to correctly anticipate the level 
of danger that a disaster will cause can result in increased loss of lives and property. 
 FEMA was established in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, after the much 
criticized response to the Three Mile Island incident (Ekici & McEntire, 2007).  The 
purpose of FEMA originally was to coordinate response efforts to disasters that occurred 
in the United States that overwhelmed the ability of state and local resources to respond 
to disasters (Leaning & Leighton, 1983; Martin et al., 2011).  At that time, FEMA’s role 
included responding to a full range of emergencies during both peacetime and nuclear 
war incidents (Leaning & Leighton, 1983).  FEMA has since undergone many 
restructuring efforts and received more scrutiny after its response to four major 
hurricanes led to legal battles.  Investigations of these four hurricane response efforts in 
2005 revealed that FEMA lacked the organization and leadership needed to respond 





failed to respond adequately, revealing that FEMA was not prepared to handle any 
disasters (Sharman, Rao, Jin, & Upadhyaya, 2008).  For instance, Hollis (2005) claimed 
that FEMA was slow and inconsistent and created a “log jam” that delayed debris 
removal throughout Florida (p. 11). 
Shifting Disaster Management Practices 
Successful emergency management practices require knowledge of the local area, 
individual communities, vulnerabilites, hazards, and resources that are available to the 
community (Coles & Zhuang, 2011; Shaefer et al., 2008).  Global scientists have agreed 
that climate change is a factor contributing to the increase in natural disasters (Kiltz, 
2011).  These factors, along with a shortage in drinking water, can cause risks of thirst 
and famine.  Other factors that could lead to greater losses in extreme weather events 
include a decline in agricultural productivity caused by the unseasonable temperatures, a 
decrease in rainfall, an increase in the rate of malaria and other diseases, and an increase 
in the human population (Kiltz, 2011).   
Emergency management is triggered when a disaster affects some part of the 
nation.  The goal of emergency management is to “intervene in a disaster, avoid disasters, 
or handle all types of operations before, during or after a disaster” (Ekici & McEntire, 
2007, p. 345).  As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the roles and 
responsibility of FEMA were streamlined to handling natural disasters.  Under the 





agency with the primary mission of handling terrorist incidents  (Martin et al., 2012; 
Jenson, 2011; Kemp, 2009). 
 One of the documents developed by this agency was the National Response 
Framework (NRF), which is used to address response to disasters on a regional level by 
multiple government actors (Gerber & Robinson, 2009).  The NRF encompasses several 
components, including threat assessment strategies, incident reporting, vertical and 
horizontal communication and information sharing, training and exercising, mitigation 
strategies, organizing and planning to mobilize resources at different levels, response and 
recovery activities, safety of personnel and the population, and the hazard-specific 
components of the above (Kapuca, 2009).   
Other directives established under the NRF included the Homeland Security 
Presidential Declaration 5 (HSPD-5) and the Homeland Security Presidential Declaration 
8 (HSPD-8) (Gerber & Robinson, 2009; Jenson, 2011; Kemp, 2009).  HSPD-5 developed 
“a comprehensive national incident management system with federal, state, and local 
government personnel, agencies, and authorities to respond to such attacks and disasters” 
(Jenson, 2011, p. 1).  This system was established to improve the nation’s response to 
domestic incidents (Reissman, Christopher, & Frye, 2010).  HSPD-8 was developed to 
provide awareness of threats posing the highest risk to the security of the nation, which 
include acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters 
(DHS, 2011).  These two directives established national goals and programs designed to 





 The National Incident Management System (NIMS), which was also a part of the 
NRF, required all government departments at the local, tribal, territory, state, and federal 
levels to conform to a standardized emergency management structure (Jenson, 2011; 
Martin et al., 2012).  Jenson (2011) stated: 
Each entity is responsible for the implementation of a standardized set of 
concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident 
command system; multi-agency coordination system; unified command; training; 
identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying 
types of resources); qualification and certification; and the collection, tracking, 
and reporting of incident information and incident resources.  (p. 2)  
These standards were passed down from the federal level to the local levels of 
government following the traditional top-down approach to managing disasters (Boin & 
McConnel, 2007; Uddin & Hossain, 2011).  The new measures taken by the federal 
government fit into the phases of emergency management identified above: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery (Kemp, 2009).  Within each phase, the local 
emergency management agenices will be able to respond to incidents at their level prior 
to requesting assistance from the the state and federal levels (Jenson, 2011; Martin et al., 
2012).   
 At the local level, there is collaboration among public, private, nongovernmental, 
volunteer agencies, first responders, and the local emergency management official, which 





Zhuang, 2011; Henstra, 2010).  These collaborative efforts historically have been absent 
at the federal level, because the federal level of preparedness is focused on national 
priorities and not local specific incidents (Henstra, 2010).   
In a holistic approach to managing disasters, local emergency management 
operates at the local level while homeland security operates at the national level 
(McCreight, 2011).  However, planning at the lowest level is necessary for emergency 
management practices to be sucessful.  This has been a controversial topic, placing the 
traditional top-down and newly practiced bottom-up approach to disaster management at 
different ends of the disaster response spectrum.   
Researchers have argued that the top-down approach, or the classical management 
theory, is still useful in the disaster management phase, which is inconsistent with the 
bottom-up form of managing disaster (Boin & McConnel, 2007).  As Boin and 
McConnel argued, when time is crucial and decisions must be made, it is beneficial to 
have those higher in the chain of command available to make those decisions (2007).  A 
limitation to this idea is that if those higher in the chain of command were not involved 
during the planning stages, prior to the disaster occurring, then they would have limited 
knowledge of what resources are available.    
Citizens, media, lobbying groups, and other political officials look to the 
government to make the decisions regarding response efforts (Boin & McConnel, 2007; 
Donahue & Joyce, 2001).  Others have argued that the top-down management approach 





resources and may attempt to undermine the authority of  local officials (Bach & 
Kaufman, 2009; Schafer et al., 2008).  Conversely, other scholars have expressed concern 
with local planning efforts that are collaborative and transparent in nature and that 
include a bottom-up form of management that first seeks the leadership of the local 
officials in handling disasters.  This is in contrast to the command and control efforts that 
are part of the federal incident management process, which does not include coordination 
at the local level (Brudney & Gazley, 2009; S. Smith, 2012).  
  In contrast to Budney and Gazley’s (2009) analysis of the bottom-up 
preparedness approach, Uddin and Hossain (2011) determined that not only should 
preparedness be built from the bottom up, but it also should involve the establishment of 
relationships with responding agencies prior to a disaster occurring.  Uddin and Hossain 
hypothesized that agencies that maintain a network relationship are able to demonstrate 
better preparedness in a disaster response.   
 Budney and Grazley (2009) believed that the top-down approach to management 
can be used if there is a single organizational response, but that in most large-scale 
incidents there is a need for multiple organizations from various locations to respond; this 
makes the traditional top-down management model counterproductive because of its 
inablity to keep track of informaton in this way (Uddin and Hossain, 2011).  Budney and 
Grazley (2009) also noted that communities are usually resistant to governmental 





Disaster Management: A Collaborative Effort 
 Managing a disaster requires a collaborative effort by emergency management 
officials, first responders, and citizens.  In order to understand the significance of each 
actor involved in disaster management, it is necessary to first examine their individual 
roles and how they fit into the overall preparedness for disasters.   
The Role of First Responders 
When a disaster occurs, the coordinated efforts of law enforcement, fire 
departments, emergency management agencies, and emergency medical personnel, along 
with other nongovernmental and governmental entities, are needed (Henstra, 2010; 
Janssen, Lee, Bharosa, & Cresswell, 2009; Nilsson, 2010).  All of these entities are 
considered the first line of defense prior to and during an incident.  During an emergency, 
first responder duties include operating within the incident command structure (ICS) by 
delegating authorites to make decisons (Sharman et al., 2008).   
Prior to an incident, first responders are responsible for assisting in evacuations, 
determining resources needed, and developing plans to coordinate information sharing 
among other emergency entities (Sharman et al., 2008).  Following the loss of first 
responders during the 2001 World Trade Center incident, emergency management has 
been placed at the forefront for preparedness (Scopetta, 2008).  However, some have 
claimed that first responders are ill-prepared and lack the necessary training and 





The Role of Citizens 
Citizens must understand that it is not solely the responsibility of government 
officials to prepare them for disasters.  Prior to a disaster occurring, citizens must take a 
proactive role in ensuring they are ready to take care of themselves for at least 72 hours 
(Biedrzycki & Koltun, 2012).  As disasters are becoming more frequently, the need to 
educate people about the risk of disaster prior to an incident is becoming more important 
than ever.   
 Communications designed at motivating citizens to act prior to a disaster 
occurring can help to lessen the potential impact of a disaster.  However, there is a lack of 
evidence-based knowledge on the use of communicating a threat to motivate people to 
change their behavior when preparing for disasters (Wood et al., 2012).  There are many 
theories associated with disaster preparedenss and communication of risk.   
In his theory of disaster, Drabek (1999) emphasized the behavioral, 
psychological, and social aspects of disaster response.  Drabek contended that disaster 
warnings impact the way people respond to a disaster, but I believe this theory holds only 
for those who have faced previous disasters.  Drabek examined the threats of denial, 
warnings as social processes, and networks of social contraints.  The first reaction to most 
warnings is denial (Drabek, 1999), which causes a delay in response.  Other factors that 
cause a delayed response by people in a group setting can also affect individual responses 
to warnings of threats.  People usually react collectively to warnings of evacuation 





which could occur in an evacution-required response (Burns & Eltham, 2010; Drabek, 
1999).  All of these factors play a role in how people respond to disasters (Drabek, 1999).   
 Wood et al. (2012) conducted a research study involving communications 
campaigns that references the way in which people need to prepare for disasters of any 
nature.  People are not motivated by what information is provided to them about 
preparedness actions (Wood et al., 2012).  When people perceive that information limits 
their exposure to a particular risk, they are less likely to be motivated to take action.  
Paek et al. (2010) examined people’s behavior at different stages of emergency 
preparedness.   
The gathering of emergency supplies was used as a predictor in determining how 
people respond at various stages of preparedness.  The amount of supplies that 
individuals have available will determine what stage of preparedness they are 
experiencing.  However, this should not be the the sole indicator of preparedness.  Other 
factors, such as having an evacuation plan and having knowledge of potential threats in 
the area, should also be considered when determining the stage of preparedness. 
According to Paek et al. (2010), the first stage of action is precontemplation, in 
which people have no intention of changing behavior in the near future to prepare for a 
disaster (Paek et al., 2010).  The next stage is contemplation, in which people are aware 
that the chance of an incident exists, but they have not commited to taking action to 
prepare for the possibility that it will occur (Paek et al., 2010).  The third stage is 





their behavior (Paek et al., 2010).  The fourth stage is action, in which people actually 
modify their behavior to overcome the threat (Paek et al., 2010).   
The final stage is the maintenance stage, in which people maintain behavior 
changes for 6 months or more (Paek et al., 2010).  Drabek (1999) contended that people 
will be motivated to take action according to how other people are taking action to 
prepare.  If those actions are favorable to an effective level of preparedeness, they are 
more likely to take similar action themselves.  Paek et al. (2010) and Woods et al. (2012) 
believed that whoever delivers the messages also plays a role in how people prepare for 
disasters.  Communication messages should be different for people in different stages of 
readiness to change.      
The Role of Emergency Managers 
During an emergency, the operations of emergency management are conducted at 
the local emergency operation center (EOC).  The purpose of the center is to control, 
coordinate, and communicate planning and decision making during an emergency 
(Sinclair, Doyle, & Paton, 2012).  Emergency managers are responsible for overseeing 
emergency management initiatives at the local level from the EOC (Chen & Peria-Mora, 
2011).  
 Emergency managers are required to make decisions that are analytical, 
naturalistic, procedurally based, creative, and distributive (Sinclair et al., 2012).  The 
analytical decision making is based on determining options and choosing the best option.  





decisions determined by their level of experience and lessons learned from previous 
incidents.  Procedurally based decisions are based on the practices that are already in 
place, such as emergency operation plans.  Creative decision making is necessary when 
there is no protocol for making decisions.  These are usually decisions that are made on 
the spur of the moment.  Distributive decision making requires gathering information 
from multiple sources (Sinclair et al., 2012).  Sinclair et al. (2012) stated that “poor 
decision-making leads to poor emergency management” (p. 160).   
 One of the responsibilites of emergency managers is meeting with and 
coordinating efforts among response agencies, which usually includes discussing actions 
to be taken in the response phase of a disaster (Asproth & Nystrom, 2010; Eighmy & 
Hall, 2012; Sinclair et al., 2012).  Another responsibility is developing emergency plans 
and procedures that include who is reponsible and what actions are to be taken by each 
entity (Eighmy & Hall, 2012).  Emergency managers are also responsible for conducting 
emergency drills, which are simulated circumstances that test their capability to respond 
to a disaster (Eighmy & Hall, 2012).  Emergency managers are also responsible for 
positioning and prioritizing materials and supplies for use during emergencies (Chen & 
Peria-Mora, 2011; Eighmy & Hall, 2012).     
 The emergency manager must understand the community’s vulnerabilities and the 
risks a potential hazard may pose for the population (Harrington, 2010; Henstra, 2010; 
Khunwishit & McEntire, 2012).  Insufficent calcuation of a threat could result in a failed 





of a threat could result in unnecessary and excessive response efforts (Rahm & Reddick, 
2011).   
Current Disaster Management in the United States 
 Disaster management has evolved over the past few decades.  Innovative ideas 
have been studied to improve preparedness for emergency managers, first responders, 
and citizens.  Based on historical disastrous events, the United States may not be prepared 
to handle disasters that affect the nation.  Although the U.S. government has learned from 
other disasters, most of the knowledge has been gained reactively instead of proactively.  
Risk Assessment 
Mitigation is defined as actions taken prior to a disaster that will minimize the 
losses suffered if a disater were to occur (Henstra,  2010).  The foundation of planning is 
understanding the vulnerabilities and risks an area has to hazards.  To prepare for a 
disaster, communities must train, exercise, meet, and coordinate with response agencies, 
and write plans to address vulnerabilites (Failth, Jackson, & Willis, 2011).  Emergency 
plans include detailed strategies for addressing vulnerabilites and risks to which local 
areas may be prone (Schafer et al., 2008).  What makes each plan unique in different 
regions is the likelihood that certain areas are more prone to certain hazards.  For 
example, people living on the West Coast may be prone to a greater number of 
earthquakes, while those living on the East Coast may be more likely to experience 





 Some have argued that a comprehensive approach to planning is better than an 
all-hazard approach, such as that adopted by DHS (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  In a 
comprehensive approach to analyzing disasters, preparedness is concentrated on a 
community’s vulnerability (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  Under this approach, if the state of 
Iowa is prone to tornadoes, then all preparedness actions are concentrated on tornadoes 
instead of all potential hazards that may affect the United States.  An all-hazard approach 
considers all potential hazards that could affect people anywhere in the world.  In an all-
hazard approach, people must prepare for all hazards, no matter where they live.  The 
benefits of a comprehensive approach versus an all-hazard approach have been argued 
because some researchers have felt that assessing risks should be the first step in the 
emergency management continuum of phases, which does not support preparedness for 
all hazards (Martin et al., 2012).    
 Information on past disasters could be used to predict the level of risk of future 
disasters (Warren & Kieffer, 2010).  Researchers in disaster mangement have proposed a 
formula to understand how risks, threats, and vulnerabilities are connected.  Risk is equal 
to the hazards multipled by the vulnerabilities minus the resources (risk = hazards x 
vulnerability – resources) (Flanagan et al., 2011).  This formula is used to explain how 
risk is associated with how preparedness efforts are to be evaluated.  Risk is determined 
by the likelihood that an event will occur, whereas the hazards are events that could occur 
as a result of the risks identified.  The vulnerabilities are determined by how people are 





2011).  Abkowitz and Chatterjee (2011) determined the cost of risk by how prone a 
region is to a particular human-made or natural disaster or an intentional act of terrorism.   
McEntire (2012) stated that that a hazard has little effect on a community if the 
community is not vulnerable to the hazard’s effects.  Some communities may be more or 
less vulnerable to different types of hazards; their risk may be lower or higher than that of 
other communities.  To better understand hazards, disasters have been categorized into 
human-made and natural disasters, all of which warrant different levels of risk for 
different communities.  
 How people perceive risk is attributed to how they behave during a disaster.  
Wildavsky and Drake (1990) introduced several theories to understand how people 
behave during a disaster.  They studied how the knowledge that people have about 
perceived risk is associated with their understanding of what they think is dangerous to 
them (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  The second theory of risk perception is the personality 
theory.  This theory is associated with how an individual personally interprets what risk is 
and how to respond to risk.  Some people are not concerned with risk; others are more 
concerned with risk and try to avoid it in all cases (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  The third 
theory in risk perception is the economic theory.   
 Because disasters rarely occur, people are more likely to take risks if they believe 
that the potential negative consequences of taking the risk are less than the benefits of 
taking the risk (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  The next theory of perception is political 





individual’s power (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  Politics may have a role in how risk is 
handled and the uncertainty that risk suggests.  The final theory is the cultural theory of 
risk perception.  This means that the cultures that are embedded in various groups 
determine how they perceive risk (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).    
 In the past, risk assessment was the work of emergency response personnel and 
decision makers.  This led to a lack of participation by those living in the communities at 
risk for hazards (Mercer, Kelman, Lloyd, & Suchet-Pearson, 2008).  Gaillard and Mercer 
(2012) stated that community members have the best knowledge of the risks associated 
with their area and that local knowledge should be used as resources to reduce disaster 
risk.  Combining local knowledge with scientific knowledge is the most effective way of 
reducing disaster risk (Gaillard & Mercer, 2012; Seneviratne et al, 2010).  Local 
knowledge is the knowledge gained from experience; scientific knowledge is the 
knowledge gained from formal methods of education (Gaillard & Mercer, 2012).  
Because the first people to respond to any disaster are usually those from the community, 
the primary decision makers in disaster risk reduction should be members of the 
community.  
 Communities must be educated on the dangers of hazardous materials and the 
routes the hazardous material vehicles travel (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  People in the 
community are the first to be affected by a natural or human-made disaster.  They are the 
main group that must be prepared  to handle this type of disaster.  However, communities 





terminals, industrial sites, nuclear reactors, power generation plants, or large-capacity 
buildings (Schafer et al., 2008).  The size and population of an area are factors in 
considering a location’s vulnerability to disasters.  In general, the more people in an area, 
the more susceptible the area is to various hazards (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).  
 The reduction of risk via emergency planning has not prevented disasters from 
affecting people (Mercer et al., 2008).  However, Abkowitz and Chatterjee (2012) 
suggested that a combination of investments in training, public awareness, infrastructure 
maintenance, rehabilitation, technology, response, and education can reduce risk.  Wang 
et al. (2011) also stated that risk reduction during the mitigation phase will reduce 
disaster risk and reduce the cost of a disaster.   
Funding 
Funding allocation has been aligned with a location perceived to be at an 
increased risk of a terrorist event occurring.  However, Prante and Bohara (2008) noted 
that risks associated with terrorism may not be the only factor that determines allocation 
of grant funding.  Political party affiliation and the power of a state’s elected officials 
may also be determinants of grant funding allocation (Roberts, 2005).  Those states that 
have a greater risk factor for terrorist activity are allocated more funding than those with 
less risk, which usually means that the smaller communities receiving less funding.  
Roberts contended that because terrorism is unpredicable, it is difficult to determine 
where the next terrorist incident will occur, so all communities should be considered, 





examined in this study, may lack the funding to support preparedness programs to better 
prepare first responders, citizens, and emeregency managers for terrorist events. 
 Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) identified how resources, institutional 
arrangements, and governance maturity are needed when addressing homeland security 
needs.  Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) and Prante and Bohara (2008) claimed that in order 
to create a more robust plan for terrorism, the plans to prepare for terrorist events should 
start at the local level.  To this end, Chenoweth and Clarke indentified interoperable 
communications, which is a DHS intitiative that has been identified as a national priority 
in combating terrorism.  Interoperable communication refers to the ability for all 
responders working together to be able to communicate using one type of system 
(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010).   
 DHS used tactical interoperable communication scorecards (TICS) to test 
resouces, institutions, and governance relationships on interoperable communication  
Ripberger (2011) and Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) stated that funding for interoperable 
communication is insignificant.  They furthur stated that no one factor, e.g., governances, 
resources, or institutional arrangements, yields conditional effects of how prepared one 
area is compared to another.  Rather, it is the combination of a higher level of governance 
maturity and institutional arrangements that yields a greater level of preparedness.  
Increased funding does not solve the problem of preparedness; other factors, such as 
security and defense policy implementation, local coordination, and implementation 






 During emergency planning initiatives, the community is less likely to be 
involved in the planning phase of preparedeness.  If emergency managers were to include 
the community during the planning phases of preparedness, the communities would have 
a better chance of facing 21st-century threats (Biedrzycki & Koltun).  Some people think 
that panic and behaving irrationally during a disaster is commonplace.  However, most 
people usually respond to the needs of their community (Henstra, 2010), as they are 
usually left to fend for themselves immediately following a sudden incident until first 
responders are able to provide professional assistance.   
 According to Okvat and Zautra (2011), a community that has the abilty to respond 
to and recover from an incident is a community that can sustain itself during and after a 
disaster.  This ability, called community resilience, is becoming more important to 
emergency management initiatives (Patricia, Nicholas, Perrin, Whitney, & Matthew, 
2010).  To be resilent, a community must have the resources and the knowledge to be 
able to use those resouces to overcome the disaster (Patricia et al., 2010).   
 The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was an example of state, local, and federal 
governments’ inability to adequately prepare for a disaster (Donahue, Cunnion, Balaban, 
& Sochats, 2012).  The lack of preparation was identified by reports from first 
responders, the media, the general public, and academicians who were involved in this 
catastrophic event.  In this event, people were left behind and neighborhoods were 





in Hurricane Katrina, there is still a lack of community involvment in emergency 
management initiatives (Biedrzycki & Koltun, 2012; Donahue et al., 2012).   
 Joint planning efforts are important for responders.  Scholars have suggested that 
emergency managers look to network theories and practices to understand the importance 
of involving multiple actors during the emergency mangement planning stages (Brudney 
& Gazley, 2009; Uddin & Hossain, 2011).  Trust and the ability to communicate should 
be developed among all responding agencies prior to a disaster occurring as a means to 
build partnerships (Hossain & Kuti, 2008; Uddin & Hossain, 2011).   
 To address the degree of trust and communication of emergency management 
actors, Uddin and Hossain (2011) conducted a study to determine if malls were prepared 
to respond to terrorist attacks.  Uddin and Hossain revealed that there was a positive 
correlation between information sharing and connectiveness of those involved who had a 
working relationship prior to a disaster.  Those who had conducted preparatory drills 
together responded well to emergencies (Uddin & Hossain, 2011).  The more involved 
actors are in the predisaster planning phases, the better they are prepared to handle an 
incident if it arises (Hossain & Kuti, 2008; Uddin & Hossain, 2011).   
 Moynihan (2008) created network theory as a means of combining the hierachial 
structure of the incident command structure (ICS), as a tool for better coordination among 
various response organizations responding to a disaster.  Moynihan (2008) noted a crisis 
management paradox, stating, “A crisis does not only require an interorganizational 





action” (p. 206).  Harrington (2010) believed that the ability of the leaders to think ouside 
the box when faced with challenging issues that fall outside of their standard operational 
procedures were important in responding adequately to a disaster.  I agree with both 
researchers because not all needed actions are written in a book.  There are factors that 
involve other actors, such as first responders, emergency managers, and citizens, who 
also play roles in the response to a disaster.      
 The ICS is used as a tool to facilitate a crisis response.  Its structure relies on the 
ability to coordinate multiple incidents and agencies.  The system is a nationally adopted 
tool supported by HSPD-8 and is used to bring all responding agencies, with different 
funtional and juridictional levels of governance, into a common framework of operation 
(Moynihan, 2008).  The NIMS used the ICS as a tool in the 1970s after responders in 
California experienced difficulty managing a wildfire that required a multiagency 
response (Moynihan, 2008).   
 The ICS generally works within organzations that have a network form of 
management.  In the case of the wildfire, ICS was used to establish command and 
control.  ICS was helpful, despite the organizations’ lack of experience in using this form 
of incident management (Moynihan, 2008).  The use of ICS, combined with the 
experience of those already possessing the skills as network members, helped save time 
and money that would have been needed to introduce a new method of handling a crisis.  
ICS and NIMS are similar and can be used in conjunction without having to retrain 





Volunteer and Private Organizations in Disasters 
The establishment of national response systems was based on the assumption that 
all responding agencies are known in advance of an incident occurring (Majchrzak, 
Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshed, 2007).  The American Red Cross, Community Emergency 
Response Teams(CERT), Volunteer Organization Active in Disaster (VOAD), Citizen 
Corps, Medical Corps, and other organizations make up a team of trained personnel who 
respond to disasters (Brudney & Gazley, 2009; Flint & Stevenson, 2010).  In large 
incidents, organizations that respond may be from different organzations with 
interdependant missions.  Some of these organizations lack the skill and resources to 
properly respond to a situation, which can inhibit response efforts (Hossain & Kuti, 
2008).  Coordination efforts in such cases can be challenging and result in poor use of 
resources and personnel.  Planning in advance of incidents can bring groups together in 
an effort to be better coordinated.    
 Haraoka, Toshiyuki, Murata, and Hayasaka (2012) examined factors that affect 
volunteers and victims of earthquake disasters.  Self-reporting questionaire surveys were 
conducted with 302 leaders of neighborhood associations.  Haraoka et al. (2012) found 
that a better collaborative effort occurs when the leaders of the organizations can 
anticipate the level of risk of earthquake damage and predict whether they will be 
affected by the damages.  In order to anticipate the level of risk, the residents need to 
obtain damage estimates prior to an earthquake occurring.  They will also have to 





(Haraoka et al., 2012).  Brudney and Gazley (2009) also revealed that involving volunteer 
organizations in routine processes of planning and training will help enhance the county’s 
overall emergency preparedness.   
Situational Awareness Module 
 Johnson, Zagorecki, Gelman, and Comfort (2011) conducted a quantitative study 
using the situational awareness module (SAM).  SAM was designed to keep track of all 
of the information that is available during an emergency and improve situational 
awareness for supporting decision making in real-time actionable operations.  
Information from SAM is compiled and assigned a number from 1 to 10, with 1 being 
minor situations and 10 being catatrophic situations.    
 One challenge in using this method is the need to customize development of the 
software to fit the models to a particular location (Johnson et al., 2011).  Because 
different locations are prone to different threats, different warning mechanisms are 
needed.  An example of these warning mechanisms is outdoor sirens, which may be 
better used in locations where people are concentrated in close proximity to one another.  
In locations where the people live in a widespread area, this type of system may not be as 
useful.  Because most outdoor siren systems have an audible range of 1 mile or less, it 
may be difficult to reach people situated in widespread areas.  
Because actionable knowledge relies on collecting and combining information 
from various subgroups of different organizations, the method of collecting intelligence 





Collective intelligence involves combined knowledge solicited from various sources that 
can be put together to be used for disaster relief (Vivacqua & Borges, 2010).  Collective 
intelligence is used in all phases of the emergency management cycles, which include the 
preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery phases.  In the prevention 
phase, collective intelligence is used to prevent any disastrous situations from occurring 
as a result of identified threats (Vivacqua & Borges, 2010).   
Data Mining 
 Data mining and information retrieval techniques have been used to cluster and 
preprocess information before it goes to those in a decision-making position (Vivacqua & 
Borges, 2010).  In this study, I propose a number of methods that can be used to assist in 
the critical intelligence gathering, which includes statistical approaches using numbers to 
determine the area of impact.  Citizens would be allowed to vote on a number of given 
options in taking a poll designed to ask questions that could help responders determine 
the level of response needed for a given area.   
 Another proposed method is deliberation, which involves gathering information 
during the predisaster stages that will help mitigate or prevent a disaster from occurring  
(Vivacqua & Borges, 2010).  A limitation to this type of information gathering is the 
small amount of information, which could hinder decision making at the responder level.  
There is concern about confirming whether information is accurate and reliable.  In any 
case, the information must be verified and analyzed before being distributed to the 






A terrorist event can trigger responses from various emergency response entities, 
including fire services, emergency medical services, emergency management, and law 
enforcement personnel.  However, resources are limited.  In cases such as the World 
Trade Center attack and the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, both of which required 
multiple emergency services, the need to prioritize resources is paramount  (Chen, Wu, & 
Wu, 2009; Coles & Zhuang, 2011).  Cole and Zhuang (2011) examined the game theory 
approach during the recovery operations.  This approach includes the local responders as 
catalysts for ensuring faster recovery of the disaster victims.   
The system employed by the DHS includes a colored-coded system in which a 
color is associated with each threat level.  Chen et al. (2009) claimed that this type of tool 
does not provide decision-making guidance for allocating resources.  This approach is 
used in the current advisory system, but allows for decision making on how emergency 
agents will best use resources in responding to multiple emergencies (Chen et al., 2009).  
This includes the ability to assign priority of resources to areas and individuals that pose 
the greatest probability of a disaster occurring (Chen et al., 2009).   
Cole and Zhuang (2011) stated that a successful response and recovery is 
dependent on properly trained and located personnel.  Communication between response 
elements is a crucial component in a stable operation.  Scholars such as Cole et al. (2009) 
and Cole and Zhuang (2009) have revealed different perspectives on how the game 





should be assigned according to the threat, whereas Cole and Zhuang claimed that locally 
trained personnel are instrumental in a successful recovery effort because the local 
responders are more familiar with the geography of the area than external partners.  Local 
responders are more involved with determining resources needed to handle a disaster than 
those who just arrive on the scene to provide mutual aid to impact victims. For which is 
true and adds value to the idea that local responders have a better understanding of their 
respective communities.   
In contrast, Smith (2012) argued that disaster response systems should not include 
consideration of  political issues, the competency of officials, detailed disaster relief 
plans, knowledge of procedures at each level of government, precision of response, 
timeliness of decisions, or full control of nececssary resources at each level of 
government because these factors are not realistic in large-scale disasters.  Smith argued 
that each agency has its own agenda and rules that inhibit a collaborative effort in 
decision making during an incident.  Others have argued that local emergency managers 
are the lead authorities in the mitigation, planning, response, and recovery efforts of 
emergency management cycles (Rahm & Reddick, 2011).   
Grounded Study 
 In a qualitative study to explore crisis leadership, Harrington (2010) claimed that 
a lack of crisis leadership, identifying threats, decision making, and proper training would 
result in failed responses to future disasters.  A lack of crisis leadership training can 





become overwhelming, the responders ignore departmental standard operation 
procedures (Harrington, 2010).  If the managers receive training in crisis leadership, the 
efficiency of their response may improve, helping them to identify and process early 
warning signs so that they can use resouces efficiently (Harrington, 2010).   
 According to Rahnama, Shoorabi, and Hadad (2012),  
Crisis management is called to a group of research skills and processes which is 
applied in unusual event or difficult situations and total systems which includes 
strategies methods and special performance for keeping social or organizational 
properties in encountering with effective crisis event which plans all natural 
disasters in all levels and stages using tools and facilities totally and practical 
activities of human and private groups. (p. 593).  
This definition supports Harrington’s (2010) view of crisis management and the skills 
needed in managing a disaster effectively.   
 Rahnama et al. (2012) investigated the role of municipalities in an urban crisis 
management structure.  As part of the study, the researchers examined attributes of crisis 
management that included conducting a risk analysis to identify potential threats and 
determine a means for correcting those difficiencies.  Rahnama et al. (2012) also included 
training of citizens and determining safe places for the evacuated citizens to go as crisis 
management roles.  Crisis management is a responsibility that should be a priority in 
dealing with disasters.  Crisis management improves with practice and, if it is not made a 





management includes not only public safety officials but also is a multidimensional 
approach consisting of other, more general parts that have an effect on crisis 
management—people and society, science, training and treatment, technology, politics, 
interns, private and public cooperation, and nongovernmental organizations (Rahnama et 
al., 2012).       
 In this study, I examined emergency managers, first responders, and citizens to 
determine why there is lack of preparedness given current knowledge about managing 
disasters.  Although various theories and strategies have been studied regarding disaster 
preparedness, people still fail to respond adequately to a disaster.  The research for this 
study was an in-depth investigation of why communities are not prepared for disasters.  I 
developed a grounded theory to help emergency managers create better emergency plans.  
A Conceptual Framework 
 Even as we face increases in global warming, increases in population, expansion 
in air and ground transportation systems, and increases in vulnerabilites to risk, people 
are still slow to prepare for disasters (Patricelli, Beakley, Carnevale, Tarabochia, & von 
Lubitz, 2009).  As a proactive approach to handling disaster, the concept of knowledge 
management will be applied to managing disasters.  Knowledge management refers to the 
collaborative efforts among various stakeholders, which in this case applies to emergency 
responders, citizens, and emergency managers who are reponsible during an emergency 
(Blackman et al., 2011).  As defined by von Lubitz, Beakely, and Patricelli (2008), 





among different pools of data and information, their consolidation into a uniform body of 
knowledge, and the extrapolation of the latter into operationally relevant ‘best practices. 
 Having knowledge and all available information pertinent to the incident will 
enable emergency managers, first responders, and citizens to better prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from a disastrous incident.  However, obtaining information that is 
incomplete or inaccurate will contribute to the failed management of such disasters (von 
Lubitz et al., 2008).  If people are not aware of the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks 
associated with a particular disaster, they will not have the knowledge necessary to 
handle the disaster.  When a disaster occurs, the information that is received from 
multiple sources should then be synthesized and verified before action is taken.  This will 
prevent making poor decisions, based on misinformation about what action is needed (Li, 
Wang, Leung, & Jiang, 2010; von Lubitz et al., 2008; Patricelli et al., 2009).   
Knowledge management, in its traditional context, is best used during predisaster 
planning because knowledge management takes time to evolve.  In the ever-changing and 
complex environments that are manifest during a disaster, knowledge management may 
not be the best practice to implement (von Lubitz et al., 2008).  Knowledge management 
should be reserved for those in senior/executive level management and should not be 
applied at the tactical level, where decisions have to be made quickly and according to 
changing conditions (von Lubitz et al., 2008).   
Traditional knowledge management is useful in synthesizing information gathered 





this level, traditional knowledge management can be useful, but in times when action 
must be taken immediately at the tactical level, a modified form of knowledge 
management is better suited to handle the disaster.  This level of knowledge management 
is called actionable knowledge.   
Actionable knowledge management combines principles of traditional knowledge 
management with collected information about the incident for the purpose of tactical 
operations (von Lubitz et al., 2008).  Actionable knowledge substitutes the traditional 
hierarchial methods of tranforming information that is provided from different sources 
and includes checking the validity of the information to more quickly synthesize the 
information needed at the tactical level (Johnson, Zagorecki, Gelman, & Comfort, 2011; 
Patricelli et al., 2009).  Having knowledge of the situation during an emergency or an 
expected emergency is important to determine the current state of readiness and to 
identify problems that could be encountered during the emergency (Johnson et al., 2011).   
The ability to receive and interpret information from various sources to create a 
common operating picture for responders who are involved in the disaster takes training 
and experience, This is why emergency managers must be knowledgable in managing 
disasters (Johnson et al., 2011).  A lack of awareness and understanding of the situation 
could result in overestimating or underestimating key resources needed, overestimating 






 The United States’ lack of preparedness and response efforts to disasters has been 
under scrutiny by many people. Throughout history, disasters in the United States have 
included human-made and natural incidents that have caused the loss of many lives and 
damage to property.  One common factor in handling every disaster has been the 
involvement of local government, first responders, and citizens.  Because the best way to 
handle disasters from start to finish is to include all of these actors, it is imperative to 
determine what factors affect their ability to prepare for disasters.   
 Research studies and initiatives have been conducted on the federal, state, and 
local levels of preparedness activities.  Scholars have examined how organizations carry 
out disaster management initiatives, such as developing tools that would assist in 
managing disasters; risk and mitigative actions aimed at preventing disasters; training of 
key personnel in crisis leadership and decision making; community involvement in 
prevention, preparedness and recovery; behavior of people with regard to viewing 
potential threats of disasters; and disaster management as a collaborative effort involving 
emergency managers, first responders, and citizens.  Yet, researchers do not understand 
the lack of preparedness by emergency managers, first responders, and citizens.  In this 
study, I examined each entity in an effort to better understand the factors affecting 







Chapter 3: Research Method 
 Disasters are unavoidable events that cause great loss of life, damage property, 
and create financial hardship.  Until the end of the 20th century, emergency management 
strategies in the United States typically were relegated to law enforcement agencies, fire 
departments, and those responsible for coordinating local disaster response.  However, 
major disasters in the United States over the past 15-20 years have caused many other 
groups to become involved in  planning for disasters (Choi, 2008).  The purpose of this 
study is to determine factors that affect the ability of three key groups—emergency 
managers, first responders, and citizens—to prepare for disasters. 
Traditionally, emergency management in the United States was a support function 
for coordinating response efforts among federal, state, and local response organizations 
(Choi, 2008).  Before 2001, emergency preparedness focused on the response phase for 
handling disasters.  Now, the focus of emergency management has been broadened to 
include other phases that support the response phase, including the mitigation phase, 
preparedness/planning phase, and recovery phase.  In each of these phases, actions must 
be taken to create a collaborative response effort by emergency management, first 
responders, and citizens in order to minimize the losses that disasters cause.  
This chapter describes the research design and presents a rationale for the design.  
I describe my role as the researcher–observer and provide an explanation of how my 
biases were to be handled.  Another section includes the methodology that I used, 





those participants.  The data collection and analysis method are also described, and issues 
of trustworthiness and ethical concerns of collecting data are discussed.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the information provided in the chapter.   
Research Design and Rationale 
 The following four research questions guided this study: 
RQ1. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other— 
significantly affect the preparedness of emergency managers in responding 
to disasters? 
RQ2. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other— 
significantly affect the preparedness of first responders in responding to 
disasters? 
RQ3. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other—
significantly affect the preparedness of citizens in responding to disasters? 
RQ4. What measures can emergency managers, first responders, and citizens take 
to improve their respective levels of preparedness in responding to 
disasters? 
 Answers to these questions were obtained from the leaders of each emergency 
response agency because they are in the position of making the decisions.  Citizens can 
also provide useful information that can be used to understand their knowledge of 





was a grounded theory developed to explain the factors that affect the participants’ 
preparedness for disasters.   
Research Design 
Grounded Theory 
 Grounded theory is a research method that emerged from research on death and 
dying by sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (Charmaz, 2006).  Glaser and 
Strauss created strategies for developing new theories based on data collected from study 
participants, rather than by testing hypotheses based on current theories (Charmaz, 2006).  
At the time, qualitative research was not well recognized in the research community 
because some researchers thought that it was unsystematic and biased in nature.  Those 
researchers considered quantitative research to be a more solid and concrete scientific 
foundation (Charmaz, 2006).  Qualitative research allows for the creation of new 
theories, whereas quantitative research seldom leads to discovery of new theories 
(Charmaz, 2006).   
 According to Charmaz (2006), grounded theory practices include  
• simultaneously collecting and analyzing data; 
• constructing analytic codes and categories from data from preconceived, 
logically deduced hypotheses;   
• using the constant comparative method, which involves making comparisons 





• continuous advancement of theory development during each step of data 
collection and analysis;  
• memorandum writing to elaborate categories, specify their properties, define 
relationships between categories, and identify gaps; and 
• sampling aimed toward theory construction, not population representation. 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as the researcher –observer in the data collection procedure was to 
facilitate and moderate the interviews, each of which was approximately 1 hour long.  For 
researchers, having the ability to broaden the understanding of how research participants 
view their situation provides an opportunity to gain greater insight into the meaning of 
the data (Hayhow & Trudy, 2006).  I analyzed the data from a broad perspective and 
began to narrow the view of the data as it became clearer, without changing the meaning 
of the information collected (Charmaz, 2006).  The grounded theory method allows for 
the flexibility to change the focus without sacrificing the data collected.  The researcher 
must seek to get the best information from the perspective of the participant(s).  The 
research problem should shape the method used to collect the data (Charmaz, 2006).  
In order to reduce the threat of bias, I paid special attention to triangulating data 
from this research.  I triangulated the findings from participant interviews, case study 
reviews, and secondary data reviews to limit my potential research bias.  I established 





views of the topic from their perspective.  I accomplished this by repeating their 
responses back to them in my own words to ensure that I understood what they meant.  
 My established relationships with the participants were a source of trust that 
likely made the participants feel more at ease and open to telling their stories.  All 
interviews were audio recorded for ease of transcription and analysis, as suggested by 
Colorado State University (2011).  Failure to accurately record information from 
participants would result in improper reporting.  Researchers must be aware of bias that 
may be introduced by discrepancies between assumptions that the researchers make and 
what the participants actually mean.  This is why I repeated participants’ responses to 
them in my own words to ensure that I understood what they were saying. 
Methodology 
Target Populations 
 The target populations used for data collection were all from the state of South 
Carolina.  The emergency managers and first responders participating in the research 
were affiliated with the emergency management field, law enforcement, fire department, 
and emergency medical services.  They were the leaders of those respective organizations 
because they were in a position to make decisions for their respective agencies.  
Residents of South Carolina have not experienced any major disasters over the past 20 
years; thus, the participants provided appropriate information for this study because they 





disasters in recent years.  The participants’ lack of experience with disasters provided me 
with insights into the reasons why people do not prepare for disasters in this area.   
 For this research study, I conducted a review of 6 documented cases involving 
major disasters that have affected the United States within the past 10 to 20 years.  
Secondary sources, such as emergency operation plans and standard operation procedures 
used for current response efforts in various counties, were reviewed to understand what is 
currently being done in those counties.    
Sample and Sampling Procedure 
  The first responder participants in the research included members from the fire 
department, emergency medical services (EMS), and law enforcement fields who met the 
criterion for inclusion in the study by virtue of their job titles.  Another group of 
participants included citizens who were selected purposively.  Those participants had 
been selected by their communities to be spokespersons within their respective 
communities on all issues brought before the Williamsburg County Council.  The final 
group of participants included emergency managers from various counties.   
 The plan was to select from 10 to 15 people from each group.  However, for each 
group the interview process was terminated only when data saturation occurred (i.e., 
when no new properties of the pattern emerged), according to Charmaz’s (2006) 
methodology.  In the initial step, participants were provided with information regarding 
the study and a request to volunteer to be a part of the research.  Only those who 





 I conducted a review of relevant documents, such as prior studies on emergency 
preparedness and after-action reviews of past disasters.  The review and analysis included 
6 documented cases involving major disasters that had affected the United States within 
the past 10 to 20 years—Hurricane Katrina (2005), the September 11 aircraft attacks 
(2001), the Oklahoma City truck bombing (1995), the Joplin, Missouri, tornadoes (2011), 
Hurricane Ike (2008), and the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon disaster (2010).   
Instrumentation 
 I was the primary data collection instrument during this study.  I used a direct 
approach to collecting the data, including gathering and sorting of case studies, 
distributing research questions, and conducting personal interviews with leaders of the 
emergency response community and various members of the community in South 
Carolina.  Participant interviews provided primary data for the study, and my review of 
documented case studies of disasters provided historical (i.e., secondary) data.  Protecting 
the personal and emotional safety of the participants was a paramount concern throughout 
this research study.   
Data Collection 
Interview Data 
 Qualitative methods usually rely on four techniques to gather information: (a) 
participant observation; (b) direct observation; (c) unstructured interviewing; and (d) case 
studies (Trochim, 2006).  Primary data to be collected in this qualitative research study 





with citizens (Wahyuni, 2012).  For this study, the experts were the emergency managers, 
first responders, and ordinary citizens included as study participants. 
 I collected data from the interview participants, following a strict protocol to 
protect the quality of the data.  To protect the identities of the participants, I recorded the 
interview responses to the interview questions and kept them separated and labeled.  The 
interview questions (see Appendix A) were based on the need to accurately answer the 
research questions without bias on the part of the participants or the researcher.  To check 
for validity as questions were answered, I allowed for detailed explanation of the 
responses if necessary.  The interviews with the first responders were conducted at their 
place of employment or via telephone.   
 I conducted the interviews with the citizens at the local emergency management 
agency or via telephone.  This is a familiar location for all citizens in Williamsburg 
County because the emergency operation center is located on the same site as the 
county’s recreation center.  The interviews with emergency managers were conducted via 
telephone or at the emergency manager’s place of employment.   
 Telephone interviews were neccesary to reduce travel time and expense to each 
county.  Interviews were scheduled during working hours for the first responders because 
it is usually easier to make contact with them at that time.  Interviews with the citizens 
were conducted after business hours because most of them work during normal business 
hours.  Each interview lasted 1 hour or less.  At the end of each interview, I asked the 





information or further explanation of their initial responses was needed.  I presented the 
consent form (see Appendix B) to participants before conducting the interviews in order 
to protect the rights of the participants.  
 Case Study Data 
 Biedrzycki and Koltun (2012) stated that the strategy of triangulation is beneficial 
because it increases validity and provides confirmation of findings to support the 
phenomenon.  Hence, 6 case studies of past disasters that affected the United States 
served as a second source of data for research.  Data were collected from after-action 
review documents that are available to the public.  The data were sorted under strict 
guidelines using open coding and theoretical memorandum writing to determine their 
relevance in answering the research questions.  
Additional Secondary Data 
 In addition to the case studies of disasters, other secondary data used for this 
research were obtained from the first responder organizations and emergency 
management organizations participating in the interviews.  This information provided 
data that were needed to better understand how the organizations operated, in an effort to 
support the goal of the research.  Secondary data collected included emergency operation 
plans, emergency response standard operation procedures, and any other information that 
could be used to explain the disaster planning currently being used by emergency 






 Wahyuni (2012) asserted that data analysis in a qualitative study involves 
organizing and coding the data into themes represented by figures, tables, or a discussion.  
He wrote: “Data analysis involves the drawing of inference from raw data.  Data analysis 
can involve multi-methods that are applied sequentially.  Performing data analysis on 
qualitative data basically involves dismantling, segmenting and reassembling data to 
form meaningful finding in order to draw inference” (p. 75).    
 During the data analysis stage, the data were organized into themes consistent 
with the overall goal of answering the research question.  Charmaz (2006) noted that data 
analysis involves “taking information and labeling, categorizing, summarizing, and 
accounting for every piece of data” (p. 43).  Data analysis is the first step in interpreting 
the information and developing an analytical view towards making sense of the 
information collected to build the analysis (Charmaz, 2006).  Data were analyzed 
immediately after collection to ensure greater accuracy in the information collected.  
Each type of data was analyzed in different ways.   
Interview Data 
 Line-by-line coding for this type of data was conducted.  This coding method 
offers the ability to break data apart, define the actions into which they fall, look for tacit 
assumptions, extract implict actions and meanings, determine their significance, compare 
data with data, and identify the gaps (Charmaz, 2006).  Because most of the participants 





coding was applicable to draw out emerging themes that would benefit the study.  
Incident-to-incident coding involves looking at each case to generate categories and then 
comparing new incidents to incidents within the categories.  The second procedure is to 
make comparisons to determine what category each incident indicates (Walker & Myrick, 
2006). 
Case Study Data 
 Incident-to-incident coding was conducted through a comparative study of 
incidents.  Incidents were compared to establish uniformity under varying conditions.  
These incidents were then compared to other incidents to generate new theoretical 
properties (Charmaz, 2006).  This method was employed because of the wide range of 
both human-made and natural disaster cases used in this study that have affected the 
United States.  Because the case study information will be found in after-action reports, a 
sense of the context, its participants, or any other information that would be obtained if 
the researcher had been involved in any of the disaster efforts is absent.  Incident-to-
incident coding techniques were considered more amenable to examining the totality of 
the incident in relation to another incident in an effort to develop emerging themes.   
 The additional secondary data collected were analyzed incident to incident 
because most standard operation procedures and emergency plans are developed using an 
all-hazard approach.  This means that plans do not address specific disasters but instead 





Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness 
 Trustworthiness was established to provide a clear and broad understanding of the 
factors that prevent people from preparing for disasters.  This required collecting data 
from multiple sources, developing a process for analyzing the data, and properly coding 
the data to complete an in-depth analysis of the information (White, Oelke, & Friesen, 
2012).   
Credibility 
 According to Wahyuni (2012), credibility is established when the data collected 
accurately reflects what is happening.  Credibility was established by conducting 
triangulation from multiple data sources.  This involved capturing information from 
multiple perspectives, which included semistructured interviews that were conducted 
with emergency managers, first responders, and citizens.  Documentation included after-
action reviews and other documents that identified lessons learned from these past 
disasters.  
Dependability 
 Dependability refers to the idea of “reliability which promotes replicability or 
repeatability” (Wahyuni, 2012, p. 77).  In this study, dependability was achieved by 
providing a detailed explanation of the research design and process that will enable future 





 Transferability   
 Transferability refers to the ability to apply the knowledge gained through the 
data collection process to other settings or situations (Wahyuni, 2012).  This was 
especially important in this study because the setting in which the data was collected has 
not experienced a major disaster in decades.  The goal is for the information obtained and 
the inferences drawn from the data to be transferable to locations where disasters are 
more probable.  This is another reason why triangulation from multiple sources is useful 
in developing a more in-depth perspective of the phenomena being uncovered.  
Confirmability  
 According to Wahyuni (2012), confirmability refers to “the extent to which others 
can confirm the findings in order to ensure that the results reflect the understanding and 
experiences from the perspective of the participants” (p. 77).  Detailed documents of the 
data collected, to include constructing memoranda and summaries in order to identify 
variations in information, will be maintained (Charmaz, 2006).     
Ethical Procedures 
 One of the first things I did was to apply to Walden University’s Institute Review 
Board (IRB) because the IRB must approve the proposed data collection methods.  
Copies of consent forms (see Appendix B) and interview questions (see Appendix A) 






 Once I had received the IRB’s approval, I selected the initial set of citizens from 
Williamsburg County to participate in the study and then contacted them via telephone to 
ask them to take part in the study.  I conducted a full explanation of the consent document 
and inquiry investigation prior to obtaining the participants’ agreement to participate in 
the study.  Once this occurred, I collected the data by in-person or telephone interviews.  
The in-person interviews were conducted after business hours at the emergency operation 
center.  Because these are public buildings, most citizens were familiar with the location.       
 The next group of people that I contacted were first responders and emergency 
managers from various jurisdictions throughout the state.  I sent each of them a formal 
letter or email, along with a copy of the consent form, explaining the nature of the study 
and requesting their participation in a face-to-face interview or, if such a meeting was not 
possible, a telephone interview.  I first contacted 5 first-responder leaders and emergency 
managers who were leaders in their respective organizations, and requested either a face-
to-face or telephone interview.  I conducted face-to-face interviews during office hours at 
their respective work places.  At the time of the formal interview or telephone interview 
session, I requested copies of secondary sources, such as emergency policies and 
procedures.  Because I currently work in the field of emergency management and have an 
affiliation with most of these leaders, gaining access to information was not a problem.   
 During each encounter with the different participants, a signed consent form was 
used to ensure that the information obtained could be used for research purposes (see 





name corresponding to the number was stored under lock and key by the researcher.  
Gaining the trust of participants was vital to encourage open and trustworthy responses to 
the questions.  Overall protection of the participants in the investigation was strenuously 
exercised throughout the data collection process.   
Summary 
 This chapter described the methodology for this grounded study, the purpose of 
which is to determine what factors affect the ability of people to prepare for disasters.  
This study explored the level of preparedness for disasters of emergency managers, first 
responders, and citizens in the state of South Carolina.  The research method used 
combined grounded theory and constant comparative exploration of data.  Grounded 
theory involves building a theory based on methods used for collecting and analyzing 
data to construct theories that are grounded in the data (Charmaz, 2006).  The results of 






Chapter 4: Results 
The purpose of this study was to identify factors that affect the ability of a number 
of key groups in the United States to prepare for disasters: emergency managers, first 
responders, and citizens. The large number of major disasters that have occurred over the 
past few decades in the United States suggests that such events will occur again. This 
creates a greater need for people to be prepared for disasters, which can cause loss of life, 
damage to property, and financial hardship.  In this chapter, I discuss the research 
questions regarding the determination of the factors that affect the level of preparedness 
for key emergency groups and citizens.   
The following questions guided the study:    
RQ1. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other—
significantly affect the preparedness of emergency managers to respond to 
disasters? 
RQ2. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other—
significantly affect the preparedness of first responders to respond to 
disasters? 
RQ3. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or other—
significantly affect the preparedness of citizens to respond to disasters? 
RQ4. What measures can emergency managers, first responders, and citizens take 






Setting and Demographics 
The study participants comprised three different groups of people, all of whom 
were from the state of South Carolina (see Table 1). The citizen group was residences of 
Williamsburg County for 1-32 years.  The first responder group participants had been in 
their current positons for   1-26 years.  The participants in the emergency management 
group were in their current positions for five months to 22 years. All participants in each 










0–5  2 10 1 
6–10   5 7 1 
11–15 1 3 1 
16–20 1 2 2 
20+ 2 4 21 
Total number of 
participants 
11 26 26 
Average years 11.30 10.28 38.46 
 
Note. Emergency managers and first responders’ years are measured in terms of years in 




Data for this study were generated through interviews and secondary data 
collection, including case study reviews. Findings were triangulated by comparing and 





manager, and first responder—to secondary data collected from six documented disasters.  
The research was conducted between October 2014 and January 2015.  The citizen group 
interviews were conducted in person or by telephone, while the first responders and 
emergency managers were also interviewed by telephone or in person.   
Interviews 
All interviews were audio recorded to ensure that answers to the questions were 
recorded accurately.  The citizen group had 26 participants, the first responder group had 
26 participants, and the emergency management director group had 11 participants.  The 
citizen group was asked 10 questions, and the emergency manager and first responder 
groups were each asked 11 questions (see Appendix A).  The questions were broad and 
open-ended to enable themes to emerge (Charmaz, 2006).  During the interview, each 
participant was given the opportunity to elaborate on any question to help solidify his or 
her response to particular interview questions.  I also asked all of the participants if they 
would be available for follow-up questions if the need arose.  The need for follow-up 
questions was not needed after interviews were conducted because all data that was 
needed to was collected.   
Secondary Data  
I obtained secondary data including emergency operations plans and standard 
operation procedures from first responder and emergency management agencies.  In all 
cases, the first responder group used the same county emergency operation plans as the 





critical to first responder preparedness and response activities before and during a 
disaster.  
   The case study review included six documented disasters that occurred in the 
United States: Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Besser, 2006), the September 11 aircraft 
attacks in 2001 (Ekici & McEntire, 2007), the Oklahoma City truck bombing in 1995 
(Geist, 2012), the Joplin Missouri tornados in 2011 (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2011), Hurricane Ike in 2008 (Sharman, Rao, Jin, & Upadhyaya, 2008), and the 
British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010 (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2011).  I collected documents related to each case that described investigations 
into preparedness measures taken before the disaster, the resulting lessons learned, and 
any recommended corrective actions.  Each of these documented cases illustrated the 
need for appropriate preparedness to ensure efficient response outcomes to disasters.   
Data Analysis 
Interviews  
 The responses were transcribed according to each interview question.  Next, I 
applied the specific analytic technique of line-by-line coding recommended by Charmaz 
(2006) to the data.  I read and reread the responses from each group using the constant 
comparative method to identify similarities and differences.  Each response was 
categorized, and from these categories, themes were developed to illustrate consistency in 
the answers until saturation was met.  The tables below show the responses to each 





RQ1. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or 
other—significantly affect the preparedness of emergency managers to respond to 
disasters?  
Table 2 
Emergency Managers’ Perspectives on RQ1 
 
Factor Numbers % 
Funding 6  of 11 55.54 
Manpower 4 of 11 36.36 
Support from 
leadership 
2 of 11 18.18 
Note. How emergency managers perceive the factors affecting their preparation for 
disaster response.  
 
Table 3 
First Responders’ Perspectives on RQ1 
 
Factors Numbers % 
No factors 22 of 26 84.61 
No connection 2 of 26 7.69 
Note.  How first responders perceive the factors affecting emergency managers’ 
preparation for disaster response. 
Table 4 
Citizens’ Perspectives on RQ1 
Factors Numbers %  
No factors 19 of 26 73.07 
Training 3 of 26 11.53 
Community 
outreach 
2 of 26 7.69 
 
Note. How citizens perceive the factors affecting the emergency managers’ preparation 





 The emergency managers’ interview responses showed that a lack of funding and 
personnel, followed by support of leadership (i.e., political and governmental leaders), 
were the primary reasons cited by emergency managers as why they felt less confident 
about their preparedness for handling disasters (Table 2).  However, participants from the 
first responder and citizen groups indicated that they believed that emergency managers 
are ready to deal with disasters (Tables 3 and 4). 
 Seven emergency managers stated that they would use increased funding to 
increase personnel, purchase equipment, or both.  Participant E-2, for example, noted that 
“Having manpower and equipment will improve their [emergency managers’] ability to 
respond to disasters more efficiently.” Sufficient funding to hire additional employees 
and purchase emergency equipment such as “radios, hazardous material detection 
devices, vehicles, [and] generators,” as stated by Participant E-5, was necessary to allow 
first responders to become self-sustaining.  If they did not own the necessary resources, 
emergency managers and first responders stated that they have to wait for other entities to 
supply them with immediate emergency resources through the use of mutual aid.  These 
requests for equipment and personnel slow down response efforts, because these 
resources may not be readily available during a disaster.  
 Support from local leadership, such as county supervisors, county councils, and 
county administrators, is also critical to emergency managers because the political 
officials determine the budget allocation for each agency (U.S. Department of Homeland 





the funding or support necessary for critical decision making, thus further hampering 
their capacity to prepare and respond effectively to disasters.   
RQ2. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizations, or 
other—significantly affect the preparedness of first responders to respond to 
disasters? 
Table 5 
Emergency Managers’ Perspectives on RQ2  
 
Factors Numbers % 
No factors 5 of 11 45.45 
First responder 
Training 
4 of 11 36.36 
Note. How emergency managers perceive factors that affect first responders’ preparation 
for responding to disasters. 
 
Table 6 
First Responders’ Perspectives on RQ2 
 
Factors Numbers % 
Funding 17 of 26 65.38 
Manpower 8 of 26 30.76 
Equipment 5 of 26 19.23 




Citizens’ Perspective on RQ2 
 
Factors Numbers % 
No factors 17 of 26 65.38 





Note. How citizens perceive factors that affect first responders’ preparation for 
responding to disasters.  
 
 As in the case of the emergency manager group participants, lack of funding and 
personnel were the primary reasons that the first responder group participants felt that 
they were not prepared for disaster response (Table 6).  The first responder participants 
also identified not having adequate equipment as another reason that first responders are 
not prepared.  However, the emergency manager and citizen group participants expressed 
a belief that first responders are prepared as they can be to deal with disasters (Tables 5 
and 7).   
 Providing training for first responders enhances their knowledge of emergency 
response and preparedness. However, 19 responders noted that funding is needed for 
purchasing equipment and funding to pay for training and training hours of those sent for 
training.  According to participant FR-10, when first responders attend training, others 
must be available to take their shifts, and both they and their replacements incur overtime 
for which additional funding is required.  
Two first responders also felt that it was important to hire “additional manpower.” 
For an emergency response agency, limited personnel can pose a problem for both 
response and training efforts. Three first responders stated that “when you don’t have 
enough trained people to respond to disasters then you either have to wait for qualified 
persons to render assistance from other parts of the state, or you can’t fully respond 
adequately to disaster. This has a serious effect on the preservation of life and property” 





RQ3. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or 
other—significantly affect the preparedness of citizens to respond to disasters? 
 
Table 8 
Emergency Managers’ Perspectives on RQ3 
  
Factors Numbers Percentage 
Depend on 
government  
6 of 11 54.54 
Training 3 of 11 27.27 
Emergency 
supplies 
2 of 11 18.18 
Equipment  2 of 11 18.18 
Note. How emergency managers perceive the factors that affect citizens’ preparation for 
disaster response.  
 
Table 9 
First Responders’ Perspectives on RQ3 
 
Factors Numbers % 
Depend on 
government 
19 of 26 73.07 
Training  2 of 26 7.69 
No Factors 2 of 26 7.69 
Emergency 
supplies 
2 of 26 7.69 




Citizens’ Perspectives on RQ3 
 
Factors Number % 
Emergency 
supplies 
6 of 26 23.07 
Planning 6 of 26 23.07 





Note. How citizens perceive factors affecting their preparation for disaster response 
  
 Both emergency manager and first responder group participants believed that 
citizens depend on the government to assist them during a disaster, which can create 
additional demands on already-strained response efforts (Tables 8 and 9).   
Insufficient emergency supplies, planning, and training emerged as primary 
reasons for citizens’ perceptions that they are not prepared for disaster response (Table 
10). Eight citizens listed “bottled water, generators, flashlights, batteries, and other 
supplies” as emergency necessities.  However, three stated that they “understood what 
was needed, but had not purchased those items.”  According to emergency managers and 
first responders, “citizens must have enough emergency supplies for at least 72 hours” 
because it could take governmental officials such as emergency managers and first 
responders that long to get citizens the emergency supplies needed for life-sustaining 
efforts.  Nineteen citizens also stated “that they did not have adequate plans in place” to 
respond to disasters, which increased the potential for loss of life. Participants C-2, C-10, 
C-12, and C-15 stated that they had plans but “have not practiced those plans.” Training 
was also a factor because some citizens did not know what was required for disaster 
preparation.  Interestingly, Participant C-2 said that “citizen training is essential in 
preparing to respond to disasters,” yet this person had not participated in any training 
offered.    
RQ4. What measures can emergency managers, first responders, and citizens 







Emergency Managers’ Perspectives on RQ4 
 
Measures Numbers % 
Purchase 
equipment 
8 of 11 72.72 
Participate in 
training 
7 of 11 63.63 
Know how to get 
resources 
3 of 11 27.27 
Note. Measures that emergency managers can take to prepare for disasters.  
 
Table 12 
First Responders’ Perspectives of RQ4  
 
Measures Number % 
Purchase 
equipment 
14 of 26 53.84 
Participate in 
training 
11 of 26 42.30 
Develop plans 7 of 26 26.92 
Have mutual aid 
agreement in place 
6 of 26 23.07 
Note. Measures that first responders can take to prepare for disasters. 
 
Table 13 
Citizens’ Perspective of RQ4 on measures taken to prepare for disaster 
 
Measures Numbers % 
Purchase supplies  24 of 26 92.30 
Participate in 
Training  
5 of 26 19.23 
Purchase 
equipment 
3 of 26 11.53 





Each of the first responder, emergency manager, and citizen participant 
groups identified training as a key measure that could be taken (Tables 11, 12, and 13). 
Available training opportunities discussed included tabletop or functional exercises 
where agencies would come together around a table or in the field and discuss how they 
would respond to potential disaster scenarios.  Incident-command, incident-specific, and 
position-specific trainings were identified as necessary for individuals to prepare for 
various roles during disaster response.  
 According to the first responder and emergency manager groups, purchasing 
personal protective and hazmat equipment, emergency vehicles, mobile command posts, 
and generators was an important disaster response measure (Tables 11 and 12).  For these 
two groups, additional emergency preparedness measures included establishing plans, 
purchasing supplies, and obtaining more mutual aid agreements (pre-established 
agreements to provide resources to a county prior to a disaster) with other regional 
entities.  Meanwhile, according to five citizens, stockpiling emergency supplies such as 
“water, generators, flashlights, batteries, [and] extra medication” was a measure they 
could take to become better prepared (Participants C-7, C-13, C-14, C-25, C-26, personal 
contact September 18,October 18, 2014; October 7, 2014; October 17, 2014, October 7, 
2014, October 7, 2014).  Overall, the research finding led the researcher to believe that 
the more measures each group takes to prepare, the better they will be able to help 






 The six documented cases examined in this study included emergency responses 
to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Besser, 2006), the September 11 aircraft attacks in 2001 
(Ekici & McEntire, 2007), the Oklahoma City truck bombing in 1995 (The Oklahoma 
Department of Civil Emergency Management, 2013), the Joplin Missouri tornados in 
2011 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), Hurricane Ike in 2008 (Sharman, 
Rao, Jin, & Upadhyaya, 2008), and the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon disaster in 
2010 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011).  Three emergency operations plans 
and two standard operations procedures guides were analyzed to compare responses to 
the research questions.  Each emergency operation plan identified the roles of both 
emergency managers and first responders.  The emergency operations plans were written 
to address the total emergency management continuum and how each phase would 
contribute to providing life-sustaining measures for citizens.   
RQ1. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or 
other—significantly affect how prepared emergency managers are for disaster 
response?  
Table 14 
Results of Secondary Data Analysis of Emergency Managers’ Perspectives on RQ1  
 
Factors Numbers Percentage 
Equipment  5 of 11 45.45 
Training  3 of 11 27.27 
Facilities 2 of 11 18.18 
Knowledge 2 of 11 18.18 





Note. Factors that affect how prepared emergency managers are for disaster response 
(based on secondary data analysis).  
 
Of the identified factors, lack of equipment and training were identified as the 
primary factors.  See Table 14 for additional factors and their percentages in regard to the 
total number of participants in the group.  The after-action review of the World Trade 
Center aircraft bombing revealed that not having “readily available” and “proper” 
equipment caused delays in response efforts (911 Commission, 2004).   
The lack of adequate facilities was identified in one of the after-action reviews 
because an “emergency operation center was housed in one of the towers,” thus hindering 
response efforts (911 Commission, 2004).  Because the emergency operation center is 
where most planning and coordination efforts take place, establishing and sustaining 
command and control were delayed (911 Commission, 2004).  Command and control 
were insufficient because agencies had not “conducted training among response entities,” 
as noted in the after-action review for the hurricane (U.S Department of Commerce, 
1995). Because of this lack of coordination, responding agencies did not know what the 
other agencies were doing or what their specific disaster response capabilities were.   
RQ2. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or 
other—significantly affect how prepared first responders are for disaster response? 
Table 15 
Results of Secondary Data Analysis of First Responders’ Perspectives on RQ2 
 
Factors Numbers % 
Equipment 5 of 11 45.45 





Planning 3 of 11 27.27 
Note. Factors that affect how prepared first responders are for disaster response (based on 
secondary data analysis). 
 
Out of the eight identified factors (Table 15), five dealt with the lack of 
equipment.  The World Trade Center aircraft bombing after-action review revealed the 
lack of “high-rise evacuation equipment” as one factor that hindered first responders’ 
efforts (911 Commission, 2004).  In the Oklahoma City bombing, “not having enough 
equipment” was a factor identified (The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency 
Management, 2013).   
Lack of knowledge was also a factor identified in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011): little to no knowledge existed as to 
“what type of chemical” could be used to properly remove the oil or the potential effects 
of human exposure to those chemicals (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011).  
Training was the second major factor.  For example, the local officials had not received 
training in preparedness or response efforts, which hindered their decision-making 
capability when dealing with Hurricane Ike (Sharman, Rao, Jin, & Upadhyaya, 2008).  
As revealed in the after-action report, a lack of planning was also a factor for evacuation, 
re-entry, shelter, and financial recovery.  
RQ3. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, organizational, or 
other—significantly affect the preparedness of citizens to respond to disasters? 
Table 16 






Factors Numbers Percentage 
Training  5 of 11 45.45 
Risk perception 3 of 11 27.27 
Communication of 
warning messages 
2 of 11 18.18 
Note. Factors that affect the preparedness of citizens to respond to disasters (based on 
secondary data analysis). 
 
Out of eight factors, five respondents identified “training” as a factor. 
Examination of the Hurricane Katrina reports reveals that citizens had not received any 
training in hurricane preparedness (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
2005).  The Katrina reports also reveal that risk perception and communication of 
warning messages were factors in this case study because citizens did not heed warnings 
provided by local officials and national weather channels (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2005).  
 Risk perception was also a factor in citizen response to the Joplin, Missouri, 
tornados (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011) because citizens had become 
desensitized to sirens and local weather advisories, resulting in their inadequate disaster 
preparation.  In the case of the World Trade Center aircraft bombing, those who were in 
the towers had never received training on evacuation procedures and did not heed the 
warning to evacuate, which was also an issue of training (911 Commission, 2004).    
RQ4. What measures can emergency managers, first responders, and citizens 
take to improve their respective levels of disaster response preparedness? 
Table 17 
Results of Secondary Data Analysis of Emergency Managers’, First Responders’, and 






Measures Numbers Percentage 
Created Plans 10 of 11 90.90 
Purchased 
Equipment  
9 of 11 81.81 
Training  7 of 11 63.63 
Conducted Exercise 7 of 11 63.63 
Note. Measures that emergency managers, first responders, and citizens can take to 
improve their respective levels of disaster response preparedness (based on secondary 
data analysis). 
  
Analysis of emergency operations and standard operating procedures identified 
measures that both emergency managers and first responders can take and support that 
can be provided to citizens for disaster response and preparedness.  Approximately 90% 
of respondents cited disaster plan creation as a critical disaster response preparedness 
measure.  Training and exercises are conducted to test capabilities described in disaster 
response plans (Brudney & Gazley, 2009).  These plans also detail needed equipment 
with information on how and when these assets will be deployed and which agencies are 
responsible for them (Table 17).     
  Plans are broken down into various sections that include but are not limited to 
transportation, communication, public works and engineering, firefighting, emergency 
management, mass care, emergency assistance, housing and human services, logistics 
management and resource support, public health and medical services, search and rescue, 
oil and hazardous material response, agriculture and natural resource, energy, public 
safety and security, long-term community recovery, and external affairs (Brudney & 





Standard operations plans include specific information on how response teams 
responsible for each of these areas will handle a situation.   
Triangulation of Interview and Secondary Data Analysis Findings 
 Tables 18 and 19 provide a comparison of the responses in both interview data 
and secondary data findings.  
RQ1, RQ2, RQ3. What factors—psychological, material, temporal, 
organizational, or other—significantly affect the preparedness of emergency 
managers, first responders, and citizens to respond to disasters?  
Table 18 
Results of Interview and Secondary Data Analysis  
INT SD INT SD INT SD 
Emergency Managers First Responders Citizens 
1. Funding  1. Funding    




    
 1. Equipment 3. Equipment 1. Equipment   
 2. Training  2. Training 1. Emergency            
Supplies 
1. Training 
 3. Facilities  2. Planning  
 4. knowledge  3. Training  
 5. 
Communication 





Note: INT =  interview data and SD = secondary data 
  RQ4. What measures can emergency managers, first responders, and 






Table 19  
Results of Interview and Secondary Data Analysis  
INT SD INT SD INT SD 























3. Training     2. Training  3. Training 
 4. Conduct        
Exercises 
2. Training  1. Purchase 
Supply 
 
  3. Develop  
    plans 
  
Note. Interview and Secondary Data 
For the emergency manager and first responder groups, the primary factors 
identified during the interviews were funding and personnel (Table 18).  The after-action 
reviews identified equipment and training needs for both the emergency manager and the 
first responder groups.  Training is needed to gain knowledge on preparing to respond to 
disasters (Department of Homeland Security, 2010).  According to participant F4 and F6, 
“more training is needed, but they don’t have the personnel to spare to send people to 
training.” After-action reviews also cited lack of personnel available to enable responders 
to attend training as a reason for insufficient training.  Emergency managers and first 





additional staff, pay for overtime for training, and build better facilities to house 
emergency entities (Kapucu, 2008).   
 The issue of training was common to all three groups.  Although the citizen group 
also felt that they were in need of disaster preparedness training, emergency managers 
and first responders pointed out that, although they have offered training to citizens, few 
have participated.  The after-action review highlighted citizens’ perceptions of risk and 
understanding of warning signs of disasters as a problem.  According to the participant E-
9, “If citizens are trained, then they will have a better understanding of the risks involved 
with disasters, and they would be more likely to take heed of warnings when they are 
sent.” Emergency managers and first responders believe citizens do not prepare for 
disasters because they depend too much on the government for emergency response 
assistance.”   
 A comparison of interview responses and secondary data revealed no common 
factors affecting how prepared emergency managers were for disaster response. 
However, in comparing first responders’ interview responses with the relevant secondary 
data, the issue of equipment emerged as a common factor.  For the citizen group, the only 
factor mentioned in both interview responses and secondary data collections was training. 
In all three groups and in both types of data collected, funding and training are shared 
factors, considering that the funding issue is common to a large number of factors 





shortages, purchasing equipment and facilities, and increasing training opportunities for 
emergency managers, first responders, and citizens.  
 In analyzing the measures that could be taken based on both the interviews and 
secondary data, the results were similar for all three groups.  Each group identified 
developing better plans, purchasing equipment, and increasing the availability of training 
as measures that could be taken to improve their level of disaster response preparedness 
(Table 19).  The measures and the factors are correlated; for example, a group that 
identified training as a factor also identified training as a measure for improving 
preparedness. This direct association demonstrates that each group recognized both its 
need for improvement and the specific area in which it needed to improve.    
Emergency Manager, First Responder, and Citizen Disaster Preparedness 
 In the literature on grounded theory methodology there are a number of methods 
of coding data (Walker & Myrick, 2006).  According to Charmaz (2008) and Strauss and 
Corbin (1990), in determining the best method to review and analyze the data generated, 
categorizing themes requires that analytical questions be asked of the data gathered. 
These questions not only provide insight into the study’s subjects but also help make 
subsequent data-gathering more relevant to the end analysis.  Based on this thinking, the 
open-coding method allows the researcher to break down, examine, compare, 
conceptualize, and categorize data (Charmaz, 2006).   
 The theory that emerged from the data in the current study is that emergency 





both independently and interdependently.  What is meant by independently is that the 
members of each group, to a certain degree, must be responsible for themselves.  What is 
meant by interdependently is that the groups are dependent on one another to do their 
individual parts, which then contributes to the success of  the collective response  before, 
during, and after a disaster has occurred.  The failure of one group to do its part affects 
the ability of the other groups to handle a disaster successfully (Figure 1).   
For example, if emergency managers do not have adequate funding to purchase 
equipment or have the necessary personnel, then they will fail to meet the needs of the 
citizens and first responders.  If first responders do not have adequate equipment or the 
proper amount of trained personnel, then they, too, will fail to meet the needs of both the 
emergency managers and citizens.  If the citizens are too dependent on emergency 
managers and first responders, then they become a burden for those entities.   
 Moreover, this understanding of independence and interdependence among 
emergency managers, first responders, and citizens must be mutual.  According to the 
first responders and emergency managers in this study, citizens depend on the 
government to provide assistance to them when a disaster strikes.  However, citizens in 
the study acknowledged that they need to do their part in disaster response and that they 
should be able to take care of their own families’ basic needs without unduly burdening 
emergency managers and first responders.  Emergency managers are dependent on first 





while, according to many first responders, emergency managers are responsible for 
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Evidence of Trustworthiness 
The credibility of this study was established by conducting triangulation from 
multiple sources, including interviews, secondary data, and case studies.  All data 
collected via interviews were vigorously analyzed line by line and categorized according 
to the themes.  Secondary data and case study analysis were analyzed from incident to 
incident and categories were established.  Dependability was established by ensuring that 
saturation was met.  Interviews were conducted (n=63), until no new themes emerged.  
Once saturation was reached, the interviews for the various groups ended.  Since most 
emergency operation plans were written in accordance with similar models, saturation 
was achieved with the review of several emergency operation plans and standard 
operating procedures.  Case study analyses identified several of the same themes, and 
saturation was met after reviewing all the documented cases.   
 In the cross comparison between interviews and secondary data collection, the 
findings can be applied to other settings or situations.  Conformability was established to 
ensure that results reflected the participants’ understanding and experiences.  Information 
was captured from multiple sources to compare results of interviews with other secondary 
sources.   
 Study Results 
According to Urquhart, Lehmann, and Myers (2010), the process of grounded 





conceptual categories (Urquhart et al. 2010).  In this research, these “slices of data” were 
obtained from interviews and secondary data and then categorized for coding.  This 
information was then triangulated with the secondary data and interview data and 
categorized into the following categories: funding, personnel, training, planning, and 
equipment by comparing themes that were discovered during these two collected 
methods, and checking for similarities for difference.  According to the findings, a 
significant association between factors affected preparedness of emergency managers, 
first responders, and citizens.  The results reveal an existing connection with both factors 
and measures taken by emergency managers, first responders, and citizens to prepare for 
disasters.   
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to present the findings.  After reviewing the 
purpose of the study and data collection protocols, a description of how the data were 
organized and transcribed was presented.  The findings are that each participant group 
identified factors that prevent them from responding effectively to disasters.  The results 
also reveal the interdependency of the three groups and the need for their improved 
cooperation in successfully handling a disaster.  
Included in Chapter 5 are a summary and an interpretation of these findings in 
relation to the literature review and the conceptual framework. Recommendations for 
further research and implications for positive social change will also be presented.  





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
Disasters are unavoidable situations that, whether caused by humans or nature, 
have the ability to cause significant loss of life, property damage, and economic hardship. 
The purpose of the study was threefold: (a) explore the factors that affect the 
preparedness to respond to disasters by emergency managers, first responders, and 
citizens; (b) develop an explanation for the interactions between various factors; and (c) 
make recommendations to enhance preparedness. Understanding why some emergency 
managers, first responders, and citizens are not prepared will help in developing better 
collaborative and comprehensive plans to address these gaps in preparedness measures.    
 This study’s findings showed that although all groups are affected by disaster, 
certain factors affect each group’s level of preparedness.  The primary factors that 
affected preparedness for the emergency manager and first responder groups were the 
lack of personnel and equipment, a finding that was aligned with Hemond and Robert 
research study on the future prospects of preparedness. The major factor cited by 
participants as affecting the citizen group’s level of preparedness was the lack of proper 
plans, equipment, and training.  The primary conclusion that emerged from this research 
is that, although each group is independent, it is also interdependent and relies on the 







Interpretation of the Findings 
The study findings aligned with the larger body of literature examined in Chapter 
2, particularly the discussions of funding and joint planning and this study’s conceptual 
framework.  Funding plays a significant role in preparedness because it directly affects 
the operations of both emergency managers and first responders.  Funding is also needed 
for purchasing equipment and meeting the staffing needs of each group.  This study 
confirmed the results of earlier research (Roberts, 2005) showing a lack of funding for 
areas not considered vulnerable to terrorist attacks.   
The area used in this study, Williamsburg County, South Carolina is a smaller 
area that faces little to no threat of terrorist attacks, thus receiving less disaster 
preparedness funding.   Counties such as Williamsburg County generally have limited 
budgeted funding because of their small populations and minimal industry.  Taxes make 
up the majority of the county revenue; fewer individual and corporate taxpayers usually 
result in budgetary constraints and, in turn, in less funding for disaster preparedness.   
These budgetary constraints can have a significant impact on disaster 
management because areas that are not at risk for terrorist incidents can still be at risk for 
other types of disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, severe thunderstorms, 
and earthquakes.  This risk of natural disasters combined with budgetary constraints was 
the case for Williamsburg County.  This lack of funding poses a problem for emergency 





equipment and supplies.  Adequate training and personnel are also affected by funding, 
which has a great effect on an entire area’s disaster management capabilities.   
Chenoweth and Clark (2010) argued that funding increases alone do not solve the 
problem of preparedness, but that other factors such as defense policy implementation, 
local coordination, and implementation during multijurisdictional response should be 
considered. The results of this research reinforce all three of their conclusions about 
factors that affect preparedness.  The fact that funding will help preparedness measures, 
but there are also there are also other factors such as policy implementation, collaborative 
coordination between first responders, citizens, and emergency managers.  
Chenoweth and Clark (2015) advocated for joint planning including both 
emergency managers and first responders, stating that all entities play a major role in 
successful plan execution before, during, and after a disaster.  This recommendation 
aligned with Henstra (2010), Janssen et al. (2009), and Nilsson (2010), who pointed out 
that effective disaster response must be collaborative.  The theory that has evolved based 
on these findings is that, although each group is independent, it is also interdependent and 
must therefore act in collaboration to plan for and minimize the effects of disasters.   
Citizens are not usually involved in disaster management planning processes 
(Wood et al., 2012), making it difficult for them to become aware of impending incidents 
that may affect them.  In this study, the responses of the citizen participants showed that 
they lacked adequate disaster response plans, reflecting a general lack of knowledge 





the information that is provided to them unless they perceive that a threat is imminent, 
which provides insight into the lack of emergency response planning on the part of 
citizen participants in this study. If citizens did not perceive a risk then they would be less 
likely to plan ahead of disaster.  
The notion of community resilience, which refers to the ability of a community to 
recover more quickly from disaster if its members are adequately prepared, further 
reinforces the argument that citizens must be proactive in preparing for disaster.  A 
resilient community’s citizens are able to survive on their own for at least 72 hours 
(Biedrzycki & Koltun, 2012).  Citizens who are resilient possess the ability to be 
prepared prior to a disaster; however, Williamsburg County citizens have not faced a 
disaster in 30 years.  This lack of recent disaster experience explained the participants’ 
low level of preparedness: They do not perceive disaster risks as strongly as other 
communities who have faced disasters more often and more recently, as suggested by 
Wood et al. (2012).   
Joint planning also affects planning efforts for both emergency managers and first 
responders. Emergency managers support the efforts of first responders and are not 
usually on the front lines of disasters because first responders handle most of the 
fieldwork.  However, emergency managers who are not involved in joint planning with 
first responders are not able to understand the needs of first responders.  The response to 
Hurricane Katrina (Drye, 2005) demonstrated the consequences of failing to plan 





citizens were unaware of the risks that the storm created, while emergency managers and 
first responders were not prepared to handle the influx of those evacuees who did heed 
warnings.   
Risk perception is another important consideration that was identified in the 
secondary data collection and during interview conducted by the citizen group, as a factor 
affecting preparedness before and during a disaster. Most citizens appear to be unaware 
of the potential risks of individual hazards to their communities (Hemond & Robert, 
2012).  This mentality is likely to cause people to underestimate or ignore potential 
dangers, delay preparations, or ignore warnings issued by local officials.   
Risk assessments are described in the literature as actions taken before and during 
a disaster; most warnings are given prior to a disaster occurring.  According to Drye 
(2005), if citizens have little to no knowledge of their vulnerability, they are not likely to 
heed early warnings to take emergency action.  Before and during Hurricane Katrina, 
emergency managers, first responders, and citizens were unaware that the area’s levees 
were susceptible to breach during a storm of Katrina’s magnitude.  As a result, warnings 
were ignored by the citizens and public safety officials, mass transit evacuation plans 
were not put in place by public safety officials, and preparations for the appropriate 
amounts of evacuation location were underestimated, all of which caused massive panic 
and great loss of life (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2005).  If a 





possible that the outcome could have been different (Smith, 2012), highlighting the need 
for joint planning for all those who could be affected by disaster.     
Knowledge management, as noted in Chapter 1, is directly related to the finding 
that emergency managers, first responders, and citizens are all part of the big picture and 
must work together in the planning process. According to Seneviratne et al. (2010), an 
organization can achieve its goals when information is shared.  This involves first 
bringing each group together to determine the risks to and vulnerabilities of an area 
before disaster occurs.  It also involves developing plans that address those risks and 
vulnerabilities.   
The planning phase is the appropriate time for each group to discuss their 
potential roles and responsibilities before, during, and after the disaster (Hemond & 
Robert, 2012).  The planning phase is also the time to discuss any specific or individual 
deficiencies and make efforts to address them.  This is important because failure of one 
group to respond adequately could create a greater hardship for the other groups (Asproth 
& Nystrom, 2010).   
Finally, the groups should conduct training and exercise drills to test those plans.  
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2011, the public is often 
invited to attend training events and assist emergency managers and first responders in 
conducting exercises.  Some drills, conducted on a national level, have been publicized in 
the media.  Drills include tornado drills and earthquake drills (U.S. Department of 





preparedness.  The federal government, in conjunction with the state and local 
government, has established September as National Preparedness Month to provide 
information to the public on disaster preparedness.   
As suggested by this study’s findings, bringing together independent groups in an 
effort to create synergy takes funding, personnel, and training to be successful.  Training 
for emergency managers, first responders, and citizens in areas of response is essential.  
Funding for personnel, equipment, and supplies is also needed.  According to Asproth 
and Nystrom (2010), when an incident occurs, there is often little to no warning. 
Everyone affected must be able respond with the proper equipment, personnel, and 
supplies (Asproth & Nystrom, 2010).   
Funding should be based on basic and forecasted needs of each participant group, 
rather than on whether or not an area is vulnerable to certain types of disaster.  Likewise, 
funding should not be allocated based on how frequently disasters occur.  Training for 
emergency managers, first responders, and citizens will enhance their individual 
responsibilities and improve their familiarity with one another’s capabilities and 
vulnerabilities.  
Limitations of the Study 
 A limitation of the research study is that the findings can be generalized only with 
careful consideration.  This is because the sampling was conducted purposefully, and all 
participants were from the State of South Carolina.  Another limitation was that the 





could potentially have different roles during an actual emergency.  An example of this is 
that the emergency managers may not be assigned the role of emergency operation 
managers during a real disaster.  Usually that role is assigned to another section leader 
because the emergency managers usually have other responsibilities during the disaster, 
such as serving as public information officers or liaisons between elected officials and 
emergency operations.  The same can be said for law enforcement officials, who may not 
assume the role of incident commander, but instead oversee the operation.   
Also, there is a difference between creating plans and putting those plans into 
action, which can limit responders’ knowledge of all phases of preparedness (i.e., 
mitigation, planning, response, and recovery).  For example, an emergency manager 
involved in the planning or mitigation process for disasters may not directly oversee the 
response efforts in the event of an actual disaster.  If this person is not part of the 
response effort, how could he or she have knowledge of what is needed during the actual 
response? There are many things that occur during a disaster that are not covered by 
emergency plans.  Thus, critical thinking and prior experience in disaster management 
play roles in being able to make decisions under stressful circumstances.    
Recommendations 
 One recommendation for further research includes expanding the study to the 
state of Oklahoma, which is threatened by increased tornado activity during certain 
seasons.  The participants in this comparative study would be similar to those used in this 





Because South Carolinians had not faced a major disaster in 25 years, they have 
not had the same experiences with major incidents as those in more disaster-prone areas.  
Expanding this research to a state that has experienced more catastrophic incidents could 
help in exploring what factors prevent those who have been faced with disaster threats 
from preparing adequately for those kinds of threats.  A comparative study using the 
same questions could be used to determine whether these factors are similar to or 
different from those affecting South Carolinians.  
The second recommendation is to expand this study to include other supporting 
agencies in South Carolina, such as hospitals, schools, and local health and social service 
departments.  Interview participants could include agency leaders who, as decision 
makers, have greater influence over the roles their agencies play.  Each county has their 
respective agencies in their jurisdictions and would be able to offer different perspectives 
on preparedness and such differences in location could result in the emergence of 
different factors.   
Comparing factors that affect the preparedness of those agencies to respond to 
disasters is also essential to the cycle of emergency preparedness.  Those on the front 
lines of disasters are supported by other agencies that must also be ready to respond. 
Emergency managers, first responders, and citizens must be aware of their shortfalls in 
order for them to close the gaps in their disaster preparedness responses.     
A third recommendation is to conduct a quantitative research study on the data 





identified in this analysis.  For instance, a survey on disaster preparedness response could 
be conducted for a county with more funding sources.  Then the researcher could 
compare by how much more prepared the county with greater funding is to those with 
little funding.   
Another example would be using those factors that affect preparedness to respond 
to disasters reported by citizens in their responses to this research (i.e., how would 
providing a group of prepared citizens with necessary emergency supplies, which include 
generators, bottled water, supply of meals-ready-to eat (MRE), tarps, flashlights, 
batteries, and weather radio, affect overall community preparedness?).   
The fourth recommendation is for qualitative research.  The participants would 
include a county supervisor, county administrator, mayor, county council, or others 
responsible for county, city, or township budgetary oversight.  The purpose would be to 
help identify the factors these participants think would prevent preparedness to respond to 
disasters and the issues involved.  A study including officials could compare the factors 
they identify to the factors identified in this research, as well as uncover other factors at 
higher levels.  Because decision makers are not likely to take part in the day-to-day 
operations of the emergency managers, they may be unaware of what happens prior to a 
disastrous occurrence.  Including the responders and citizens (who will actually face the 
disasters) in the study would provide these officials with a better idea of how their 





findings could help them to become more intimately involved in disaster preparedness 
efforts.     
A final recommendation is to conduct an in-depth study of the citizens in terms of 
community resilience.  A resilient community will be able to recover from a disaster 
more quickly than a community that is not (Norris et al., 2008) because it has taken the 
steps to be prepared.  The study would include citizens in disaster-prone communities 
who generally have a greater level of experience in handling disasters.  The purpose of 
this study would be to examine what preparedness measures have been taken in these 
communities and determine whether they are more resilient after disasters.  This 
information can be used to assist communities that are not prepared for disasters to 
become more prepared and show them the benefits of better preparation.   
Implications for Social Change  
 This study has many implications for social change among emergency managers, 
first responders, and citizens, including how to prevent and plan for disasters and how to 
respond to and recover from a disaster.  Below, each group is discussed separately to 
explain their individual implications for social change as well as how they affect social 
change together.  
Emergency Managers  
In most cases, emergency officials provide support for both first responders and 
residents during a disaster.  They also play a significant role in every part of the stages of 





and recovery.  The study results revealed factors that affected the emergency 
management group’s ability to prepare to respond to disasters.  The idea that citizens 
believed that emergency managers were prepared to handle disasters placed unrealistic 
expectations on the emergency management group to perform at a higher level.   
Recognizing the gaps in preparedness revealed during this investigation will offer 
emergency managers a better understanding of what is needed before disaster occurs.  
This information can be used to assist in writing emergency plans that better address 
these gaps.  An example of one factor revealed during this research was the lack of 
personnel.  Emergency plans should describe how additional staff would be acquired, 
what types of personnel would be needed and how many, and from where the assistance 
would be requested,     
 The results of this research can also provide other emergency responders with 
information to help them realize that others face the same preparedness issues.  This 
information  could serve as a catalyst for change that would allow county emergency 
managers to come together to determine the best course of action to handle incidents and 
find out how other counties could help during a disaster.   
The results of this study can also be used to raise awareness among officials and 
decision makers regarding the need to increase funding for emergency preparedness 
efforts.  Some officials are not very familiar with all roles of emergency managers, which 





request during budget season.  Officials who are more familiar with the role of 
emergency management may be more likely to provide additional funding.    
First Responders  
The first responders are considered the group of people who execute the 
emergency plans. If the emergency plans included how first responders send people into a 
“hot zone” to perform decontamination efforts for those who have been exposed to a 
chemical, it would be clear that the first responders would need the proper equipment and 
personnel to conduct the decontamination effort.  This study revealed that two of the 
factors that affect disaster response preparedness are lack of personnel and equipment. 
Not knowing this could be problematic for emergency managers and citizens.   
Citizens involved in hazardous material emergencies expect the first responders 
and emergency managers to provide them with the help they need.  Emergency managers 
depend on the first responders to be able to execute the emergency operation plan.  A 
lack of communication affects everyone.  This study helps provide a better understanding 
of what is needed so that emergency managers and citizens will identify which 
emergency actions they need to prepare themselves for in case of disasters.  It will also 
help emergency managers and first responders determine the gaps in their response 
efforts in order to make adjustments to the emergency plans, such as creating a mutual 
aid agreement with neighboring counties to provide additional personnel and equipment 






On an individual level, everyone must be vigilant to the risk of potential disasters. 
Citizens are responsible for their personal safety until professional help arrives and must 
be able to survive on their own for at least 72 hours.  Thus, for citizens to be prepared, 
they must take action before a disaster occurs.  The study revealed factors that affected 
citizen preparedness to respond to disasters.  This information is useful to emergency 
managers and first responders in helping citizens prepare for disasters through activities 
such as citizen training classes.  However, as mentioned earlier, it is difficult to get 
citizens to participate in training.  One possible solution could be to create incentives 
such as emergency supply kit giveaways.  Conducting surveys to determine who is 
interested in attending training and what type of training they are requesting is another 
possibility.  
Once training requests are obtained, class schedules could be published in local 
newspapers, on the Internet, and in public address notices.  Sessions could include 
information explaining the roles of emergency managers and first responders during a 
disaster.  The classes could also be used to distribute printed material that includes 
emergency supply checklists. 
Citizen training classes could also be used to help people learn about evacuation 
routes, shelter locations, and other facilities that would be made available during and 
after a disaster.  Ultimately, what is known can be addressed, but what is unknown cannot 





water, MREs, and other emergency supplies for emergency distribution. If they know that 
citizens in their community do not have these emergency supplies on hand, they can take 
steps to ensure that they receive them.  Emergency managers will also be able to plan in 
advance as to how such items would be distributed to the citizens when needed.   
Emergency Managers, First Responders, and Citizens 
Each group offers a valuable contribution to overall community disaster 
preparedness.  However, cooperation between these groups is necessary to develop better 
plans to address the gaps in past and current response efforts.  Each group must 
understand the needs of the others and collectively determine how to address those needs.   
We create positive social change through better understanding each person’s 
deficiencies and examining disaster preparedness holistically from the perspectives of 
emergency managers, first responders, and citizens.  Collaborative effort will foster the 
development of better emergency plans and create better relationships among emergency 
managers, first responders, and residents.  This does not mean that they will be able to 
prevent problems, but it will improve a community’s ability to plan for, respond to, and 
recover more easily from disasters.  
Conclusions 
 Understanding the various roles that emergency managers, first responders, and 
citizens play in handling disaster is the first step in responding to them.  The second step 
involves determining what factors affect the successful preparedness of each group to 





plans that address the gaps in their preparedness efforts.  Finally, all groups must meet to 
conduct exercise drills to test their plans in an effort to ensure that all factors have been 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
Emergency Managers 
1. Have you ever been involved in a disaster? If so, then what kind of disaster? 
2. How prepared do you think you are if a disaster were to occur today? 
3. Do you feel that you had adequate resources to respond to these disasters or 
any other disaster that may affect your area? If not, then what do you think 
you need? 
4. What factors would prevent you from preparing for a disaster? 
5. Have past disasters that have affected United States made you more likely to 
prepare to prepare for future disaster? If so, then why? If not, why? 
6. Do you feel that the first responders have done enough to be prepared for 
disasters? If not, then what is needed? Why? 
7. Do you feel that the citizens have done enough to be prepared for disasters? If 
not, then what is needed? Why? Why do you think it is important for people to 
be prepared for disasters? 
8. What would affect your future decision to be better prepared? 
9. Do you feel it is necessary to be prepared for a disaster? If so why? 
 
10. How long have you worked in your current position? 
 
First Responders 
1. Have you ever been involved in a disaster? If so, then what kind of disaster? 





3. Do you feel that you had adequate resources to respond to these disasters or 
any other disaster that may affect your area? If not, then what would be 
needed?  
4. What factors would prevent you from preparing for disasters? 
5. Do you feel that the emergency managers have done enough to be prepared 
for disasters?  If not, then what is needed? Why? 
6. Have past disasters that have affected the United States made you more likely 
to prepare for future disasters? If so, then why? 
7. Are you familiar with the hazards that have the potential of affecting where 
you live? 
8. Do you feel it is necessary to be prepared for disasters? If so, then why? 
9. What do you think you could to better prepare your agency for disasters? 
10. Do you feel that the citizens have done enough to be prepared for disasters?  If 
not, then what is needed? Why? 
11. How long have you worked in your current position?  
Citizens 
1. Have you ever been involved in a disaster? If so, then what kind? 
2. How prepared do you think you are if a disaster were to occur today? 
3. What measures have you taken to prepare for a disaster? 





5. Do you feel that first responders and emergency managers have done enough 
to prepare you for disasters? If not, then what is needed? Why? 
6. What do you think you could do better to be prepared for disasters? 
7. Have you received any training in preparing and handling disasters? 
8. Are you familiar with the hazards that have the potential of affecting where 
you live? 
9. Have past disasters that have affected the United States made you more likely 
to be prepared for future disasters? If so, then why? 








Appendix B: Consent Form – First Responder/Emergency Manager 
You are invited to take part in a research study to understand what factors affect people in 
preparing for disasters. The researcher is inviting adult citizens, emergency managers, 
and leaders in the first responder community living in South Carolina to participate in the 
study. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to 
understand this study before deciding whether to take part. 
 
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Tiffany Cooks, a doctoral student at 
Walden University.  You may already know the researcher as a colleague or a member of 
Williamsburg County Public Safety in the field of Emergency Management, but this 
study is separate from that role. 
 
Background Information: 
The purpose of this study is to discover the extent to which emergency managers, first 
responders, and citizens are prepared for potential disasters that may affect the state of 
South Carolina and how this level of preparedness might be improved. The findings from 
this study will, hopefully, lead to the development of better emergency management 
policies and procedures.  
 
Procedures: 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:  
• spend approximately one hour to answer interview questions by phone. 
• conduct the interview via telephone.  
• agree to sign and return consent form prior to interview being conducted by 
means of email. 
• agree to a follow-up interview after the initial interview is conducted, if needed  
• agree to include copies of standard operations procedures, emergency operation 
plans or any documents pertaining to emergency response, during the interview or 
email a copy following the interview.   
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
This study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether or not you 
choose to be in the study. No one at Williamsburg County Emergency Management will 
treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you decide to join the study 
now, you can still change your mind later. You may stop at any time.  
 
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be 
encountered in daily life, such as fatigue, stress, or becoming upset. Being in this study 






The benefits of the study will involve gaining a better understanding of the effectiveness 
of current emergency management programs. 
 
Payment: 
There is none 
 
Privacy: 
Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The researcher will not use your 
personal information for any purposes outside of this research project. Also, the 
researcher will not include your name or anything else that could identify you in the 
study reports. Data will be kept secure by the researcher in a locked file cabinet. Data will 
be kept for a period of at least five years, as required by the university. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may 
contact the researcher via telephone at 803-847-0830 or by email at 
emonya01@yahoo.com. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, 
you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University representative who can 
discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. Walden University’s approval 
number for this study is  08-18-14-0176859 and it expires on  August 17, 2015. 
 
The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.  
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a 
decision about my involvement. By signing below, or replying to this email with the 




Printed Name of Participant  
Date of consent  
Participant’s Signature  





Appendix C: Consent Form – Citizen 
You are invited to take part in a research study to understand what factors affect people in 
preparing for disasters. The researcher is inviting adult citizens, emergency managers, 
and leaders in the first responder community living in South Carolina to participate in the 
study. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to 
understand this study before deciding whether to take part. 
 
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Tiffany Cooks, a doctoral student at 
Walden University.  You may already know the researcher as a colleague or a member of 
Williamsburg County Public Safety in the field of Emergency Management, but this 
study is separate from that role. 
 
Background Information: 
The purpose of this study is to discover the extent to which emergency managers, first 
responders, and citizens are prepared for potential disasters that may affect the state of 
South Carolina and how this level of preparedness might be improved. The findings from 
this study will, hopefully, lead to the development of better emergency management 
policies and procedures.  
 
Procedures: 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:  
• spend approximately one hour to answer interview questions either by phone or in 
person 
• conduct the interview at the emergency management office located at 2086 
Thurgood Marshall Highway, Kingstree SC. 
• agree to have tape-recorded interview 
• agree to a follow-up interview after the initial interview is conducted, if needed  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
This study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether or not you 
choose to be in the study. No one at Williamsburg County Emergency Management will 
treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you decide to join the study 
now, you can still change your mind later. You may stop at any time.  
 
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be 
encountered in daily life, such as fatigue, stress, or becoming upset. Being in this study 
would not pose risk to your safety or wellbeing.  
 
The benefits of the study will involve gaining a better understanding of the effectiveness 







There is none 
 
Privacy: 
Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The researcher will not use your 
personal information for any purposes outside of this research project. Also, the 
researcher will not include your name or anything else that could identify you in the 
study reports. Data will be kept secure by the researcher in a locked file cabinet. Data will 
be kept for a period of at least five years, as required by the university. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may 
contact the researcher via telephone at 803-847-0830 or by email at 
emonya01@yahoo.com. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, 
you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University representative who can 
discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. Walden University’s approval 
number for this study is 08-18-14-0176859 and it expires on August 17, 2015. 
 
The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.  
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a 
decision about my involvement. By signing below, or replying to this email with the 




Printed Name of Participant  
Date of consent  
Participant’s Signature  
Researcher’s Signature  
